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The ARDP in Quotations 
"Experience since Independence with the difficulties oí implementing small construction and 
other rural improvement projects indicates that dramatic progress cannot be expected" 
(National Deveiopment Plan 1973-1978, page 41) 
We were shattered actually at the speed with which they intended to act and then did act" 
(a central government official) 
"The Districts were suffering from shock for several months" 
(a districtict-level official) 
"A lot of screaming and bad words.. and then people got down to it" 
(a council official) 
"What is rather good about a crunch like this is being able to say OK, put your plan on the table 
and say you can start. . . T h e crunch of planning should be that every Ministry should have plans 
on h a n d . . . " 
(a central government official) 
"We were told "Don't worry about the money. We will give it to you as you need it" 
(a council official) 
"Oh by the way I hear there's some ARDP money lying around — we must get in" 
(reporteclly a contractor overheard on the Oaborone golf course) 
"The Council's success in solving the logistical problems amazed me" 
(a well-informed observer) 
"The speed with which they (the large contractors) put things up staggered the Council" 
(a council official) 
"The normal slippage which we depend 011 dicl not occur" 
(a finance officer) 
"The Councils also wanted to say something and were a bloody nuisance" 
(a contractor) 
"It was all the time Gaborone ancl these people workecl for Gaborone" 
(a District Commissioner, speaking of contractors) 
"I liked the protests from the districts. It showed that they were alive" 
(a central government official) 
"These buildings are rather strange to us and I do not think our works teams will be able to 
maintain them" 
(a Council Works Superintendent) 
"They (contractors) got away with some things they should not have got away with" 
(a District Commissioner) 
'We are capable of making mistakes in our own quiet way without this sort of thing" 
(a central government offical) 
'Who the hell wants a tarred road in a village anyway?" 
(an inhabitant of Gaborone) 
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"ARDP will always be remembered in some villages; people were pleased with their compensation" 
(a District Commissioner) 
"We learnt about villages we had never been" 
(a contractor) 
"We are really not very happy about how it was done but we are very glad that something was done" 
(a District Commissioner) 
"We really enjoyed it because everyone worked at a high pitch and it really pulled the office 
together, with a clear goal to work for" 
(a central government offiáal) 
"There was an awful lot of evening and weekend work" 
(a council offiáal) 
"The construction phase was quite the worst experience of my life" 
(a district-level offiáal) 
"I had a physical breakdown" 
(a counál offiáal) 
"It was the first time people looked at the bureaucracy of government and council and asked — 
how can we make this more efficient?" 
(a counál offiáal) 
"Since the ARDP we feel that there has been an equal share" 
(a District Commissioner) 
"We are aware now that there is local government" 
(a professional officer in central government) 
General Verdicts 
"It was a building programme. I do not think it was a development programme" 
"It broke down a lot of psychological barriers" 
"It was more an attitude of mind than a programme" 
"Never again" 
"A hell of a lot got done; and all the carping is a bit of a luxury." 
"We are a more or less permanent ARDP now" 
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There is confusing and inconsistent usage of the words "large," "major," "small," and "minor" to 
describe categories of villages. T h e National Development Plan 1973-78 distinguished large 
villages, with populations over 1,000, médium villages with populations of 500 to 1 000, and small 
villages with populations of less than 500 (NDP3:9). Much of the ARDP had its own división into 
two classes of village: large, or major villages, which were those in which buildings were 
constructed by big contractors; and small or minor villages where construction was carried out by 
or supervised by the District Councils. This división was once-only and ad hoc for adminstrative 
convenience and was not strictly based upon population (see para 3.43). T o avoid confusion with 
the categories used in NDP3 and elsewhere, the usage in most of this report will be: 
"larger villages" = those (27) villages where big contractors built 
"small villages" = those (some 195) villages where Councils or small contractors built. 
An exception to this usage is the water projects where the official terminology of major, large and 
small villages is followed. It should be noted that neither the "smaller villages" as defined above, 
ñor the "small" villages of the water projects were defined in the same way as the "small" villages of 
NDP3 — i.e. with populations of less than 500. Finally, the programme of major roads through 
villages was confined to eight of the largest villages (see para 2.1.). 
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Preface 
The consultancy which has given rise to this report was sponsorecl by the Commonwealth Fund for 
Technical Cooperation. I spent from 6 November to 11 December 1976 in Botswana. A first draft of 
the report was discussed on December 10 at a seminar at the Institute of Deveiopment 
Management in Gaborone. I have subsequently worked on a fairly major revisión of the draft 
while at the Institute of Deveiopment Studies in the UK, benefitting from criticisms and 
suggestions both from Botswana and from colleagues in IDS. T h e responsibility for the views 
expressed is, however, entirely mine. 
My terms of reference were: 
"to evalúate the achievements made under the Accelerated Rural Deveiopment Programme 
recently completed in Botswana, to identify the lessons learnt and to make recommendations 
for future action. Specifically the consultant will look into the following: 
(a) Project selection and appraisal. T h e analysis should provide information on the actual 
methodology of selection and appraisal with emphasis on efficient allocation of resources. 
(b) Preparation, procedures and achievement. Comparison of actual achievements with original 
physical and financial targets. 
(c) Financial control/control mechanism. 
(el) Information/monitoringsystems. An analysis of linkages between ministries and with district 
level planning authorities. 
(e) Performance of District Council Work Units. Evaluation of the performance and potential of the 
work units in implementing the ARDP. 
(f) Major constraints. Identification of the major constraints in achieving targets at projected 
costs and within the projected time frame. 
(g) Costs and Benefits. Analysis of the direct and indirect costs and benefits of the ARDP. Cióse 
attention to be given to the overall distribution of costs and benefits by región and receiver 
group, particularly the employment and income effeets. Of concern here is the alteration in 
the costs and benefits occurring because of the accelerated nature of the ARDP. 
(h) Impact ofthe ARDP. An analysis of the social and political impact of the ARDP on the Rural 
populous' attitudes toward Government and rural deveiopment. 
(i) Effect on larger Deveiopment Programme. An examination of the effect of the ARDP on the 
balance of Government's deveiopment programme." 
As the charitable reader will appreciate, attempting to cover these terms of reference in about 
one month required that the evaluation be selective. A balance had to be struck between time spent 
in the field and in interviews, and time spent drafting. I had the aclvantage of a week visiting 
Tsabong, Ghanzi, Maun, Shakawe, Gomare, and Serowe, and then Mogorosi, Tlhabala, 
Moijabana and Shoshong, and of day visits to Molepolole, Mochudi and Kanye. And I was able to 
interview, both in Gaborone and elsewhere, central and local government officials, contractors, 
and people living and working in rural areas. All the same, time was short and there were many 
people and places I should have seen but did not. A comprehensive and exhaustive study based on 
my terms of reference would have taken several man-years and would have led to a massive 
report. But work and writing have to shrink to fit the time available. In the spirit of my terms of 
reference, I took the view that ex post evaluation would be sterile unless it identified lessons which 
could be applied in the future. I have therefore tried to avoid excessive immersion in detail and 
have instead tried to tease out some of the main threads and to draw the main conclusions which 
seem possible. These are less well foundecl in carefully checked fact than I should have liked, 
but to the best of my knowledge and judgement they are correct. 
That said, it would be surprising if there were no errors in this report. For reasons of time, I 
have had to rely heavily on interviews rather than detailed study of written records. I have tried to 
canvas different points of view on controversial points but I cannot pretend that my coverage has 
been as full as I should have liked. T o those whom I have not consulted, and to any organisation or 
person misjudged or misrepresented, I apologise. 
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I am grateful to all who have enabled me to complete this report. T h e data could not 
conceivably have been compiled in the time available without the full cooperation of many people 
in the ministries and in the districts. I was also helpecl in the interpretation of my terms of 
reference by the interministerial Reference Group which was set up to guide the consultancy. I 
have begun to list those whom I wish to thank for their help only to realise that once I start naming 
ñames it is exceedingly difficult to know where to stop. However, I would like to record with 
thanks that the report could not have come out in anything like its present degree of completeness 
without the painstaking and detailecl contributions of Jenny Shepherd in MFDP and David 
Watson in MLGL. T h e many others in the Districts and in the Ministries, especially in the Rural 
Development Unit in the MFDP, who went out of their way to provide me with detailecl 
information, comments, and support, often at short notice, know themselves who they are and 
will, I hope, allow me to express my gratitude in the form of this general acknowledgement. 
It was a privilege to be invited again to Botswana. I hope that uses will be found for this report 
which will justify the time and energy of those in Botswana who have contributed to it. I have 
attempted in the final section to draw some of the main lessons which, as they seem to me, emerge 
from the experience of the ARDP. Like so many of Botswana's innovations in rural development, 
the ARDP has importance for other countries. I hope that the lessons of this experience can be 
made available to those elsewhere who are also engaged in the struggle for rural development 
with social justice. 
Robert Chambers, 
Institute of Development Studies 
University of Sussex 
Brighton BN1 9RE 
England. 
7 February 1977 
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Surnmary 
The Third National Development Plan 1973-78 set a high priority on rural development. In 
1972/73 Botswana achieved budgetary self-sufficiency for the first time and funds became a less 
serious constraint on development. At the same time the need for rural infrastructure was acute 
and becoming more so. In both Central Government and more particularly in District Councils, 
institutional developments including the creation of the Rural Development Unit reporting 
direct to the Vice-President, and the recruitment of staff to strengthen District Councils, were 
augmenting the capacity to implement programmes. A sense of opportunity and urgency was 
enhanced by a general awareness that the Government had not yet been able to achieve dramatic, 
tangible results in most of the rural areas where the great majority of the people lived and by the 
steady approach of the date in October 1974 when the electorate would pass their verdict on the 
Government's performance. The Accelerated Rural Development Programme (ARDP), resulting 
from a Cabinet Decisión in November 1973, was a logical outcome. 
T h e ARDP had as a primary objective that projects should be visible on the ground by a target 
date of 30 September 1974. Various "invisible" projects were proposed but dropped. Visibility 
carne to mean mainly buildings, roads and water supplies. Building construction was undertaken 
in 27 larger villages by big contractors and in 195 smaller villages by District Councils and by 
médium and small contractors. Other programmes were undertaken either by contractors — 
much of a programme for drilling boreholes in villages, and a programme for tarree! major roads 
through large villages — or directly by Government Ministries or Departments. While a start had 
been made on most of the programmes by the target date, the ARDP was twice prolonged and 
finally ended only on 31 March 1976. By that time it has cost just over 21 million Pula. Of this sum, 
the Ministry of Local Government and Lands accounted for 53 per cent, the Ministry of Works 
and Communications for 25 per cent, and the Ministry of Mineral Resources and Water Affairs for 
19 per cent. The Ministry of Agriculture's share was only 2.3 per cent. 
T h e most accelerated and most controversial programme was major roads through villages. 76-
79 km of tarred road were to be made in eight of the largest villages. Because of urgency, the work 
was put out to tender on the basis of a schedule of rates insteael of a bilí of quantities. When it was 
found that the cost would be much higher than expected, the length and width of tarmac were 
reduced. T h e final cost of Pula 43 700 per km was high compared with Pula 27 600 for a short 
stretch of the North-South road constructed to higher specifications. Much dissatisfaction was 
expressed about the roads, especially the narrow access culverts and the deep ditches. Even at 
these high costs the roads were, however, probably justified economically because of the growing 
volume of traffic in the villages concerned. 
The construction of buildings in the larger and smaller villages accounted for 43 per cent of all 
ARDP expenditire. T h e main components were primary school classrooms, stores and latrines, 
teachers' quarters, health clinics and health posts, and District Council and Administration 
housing. After a competitive tender, work in the larger villages was awarded to big contractors 
using conventional construction for some villages and prefabricated construction for others. 
There were many complaints about the prefabricated buildings put up by Modular Construction. 
Costs generally were high. Work was carried out most rapidly in the Northern Kgalagadi where 
the impact was dramatic. In the smaller villages, District Councils and smaller contractors shared 
the work. Performance was mixed but more was done than many would have expected. By 31 
March 1976, for example, 305 classrooms had been constructed in the smaller villages alone. This 
may be compared with the five-year target of NDP 3 of 700 classrooms in the whole country. 
It is dificult to compare the costs of the big contractors in the larger villages and those of tne 
District Councils' Work Units and of small contractors in the smaller villages, not least because 
many of the costs in the smaller villages were hidden in Councils' recurrent expenditure. 
However, it is probable that the M2 cost to Government and Councils was higher in the larger 
villages than in the smaller villages. This is partly because of the higher overheads, supervisión 
costs, and wage bilis of the big contractors in the larger villages. T h e ARDP identified and assisted 
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small contractors who became more experienced and more competitive. District Councils' Works 
Units were on the whole slow, expensive and inefficient. The ARDP not only achieved much 
infrastructural building; it also developed the national capability to build. 
T h e school furniture programme, organised by the Botswana Enterprise Deveiopment Unit 
(BEDU), involved two small engineering firins which successfully substituted local for imported 
fabrication of school furniture and which towards the end of 1976 had become independent of 
BEDU and were handling a third school furniture contract. 
T h e village water supplies programme used the Domestic Deveiopment Fund to engage 
contract borehole drilling for small villages, thus diverting contract drilling from cattle posts 
where it would benefit those who were already well off to villages where the water would be of 
more general benefit. Contract drilling was competitive and fairly cheap. T h e 25 small villages 
affected by 31 March 1976 benefitted from their water supplies earlier than they would have done 
without the ARDP. 
In the Ministry of Agriculture both the livestock saleyards project suffered from, and were 
delayed by, staffing problems, but performance improved. The experience with these two projects 
illustrates the extent to which implementing capacity rather than finance was the main constraint 
in the Ministry. It also highlighted the priority of innovations in management "to enhance the 
Ministry's capacity to implement. 
Since budgetary self-sufficiency was achieved in 1972/73, implementing capacity has been more 
of a brake on deveiopment than have shortages of funds. In these circumstances it is often rational 
to use money to buy or expand implementing capacity, which is precisely what the ARDP did by 
putting work out to contractors. 
T h e speed of the programme did, however, probably mean that some donor funds were 
foregone. For example, the DDF was used to finance Pula 2.6 million of the primary school 
improvement programme which might, with less urgency, have been provided by SIDA. 
T h e ARDP was timely, coming as it did near the end of the construction phases of the Shashe 
and Orapa projects, and helped to level off the trough in capital spending and construction. T h e 
overheating of the construction sector by the ARDP has been exaggerated. Statutory wage 
increases were a more significant factor in higher contract prices, and the ARDP's contribution 
appekrs to have been relatively minor, during six months of 1974 of the order of 8 per cent. 
T h e ARDP did little damage to other programmes, since what was delayed or left undone as a 
result of the ARDP was usually of low priority. T h e ARDP did, however, provide a convenient 
scapegoat to blame for delays and deficiencies. It also showecl up ministries, departments and 
individuáis responsible for lagging performance, and showed that they could do more and do it 
faster. 
T h e administrative and accounting load placed on District Councils by the ARDP created a 
crisis which was largerly overcome through streamlined procedures and diligent work by Council 
staff. One factor was a reporting and monitoring system designed to improve financial and 
physical monitoring and control. This management system proved effective and has been 
continued and refined. 
T h e ARDP enhanced implementing capacity. In particular, it increased the capacity and 
credibility of District Councils and competence and confidence of Council staff. 
During 1974-5 the ARDP may have generated an average monthly employment for semi-
skilled and unskilled labour of the order of 2 000 to 3 000 persons, with a gross payment in wages of 
Pula 1.2 to 1.8 million, or from 12 to 18 per cent of ARDP expenditure in that financial year. T h e 
ARDP does not appear to have led to wage rises. Some additional long-term employment was 
created, especially through the growth of small building contractors and the new, higher plateau 
of District Councils' building programmes. 
District-wise ARDP expenditures have to be treated with great care in assessing the regional 
distribution of benefits from the ARDP. Per caput expenditures tended to be high where 
implementation was relatively easy (South East, Kgatleng) and where special measures were taken 
to augment implementing capacity (Kgalagadi) and low where implementation was difficult for 
reasons of scale (Central) or administrative capacity was a special problem (North West). 
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Except in the North East District, self-help made little contribution to the ARDP. T h e effect of 
the ARDP on self-help is difficult to assess but it probably dicl not weaken self-help much. Self-help 
has some disadvantages, and will anyway continué for purposes which touch people closely. A 
sensitive review of VDC's Community Development and self-help would be timely to see the best 
way forwarcl. 
T h e A R D P helped to combat the bias of services towards towns and large villages and to push 
services out towards the rural periphery where most of the poorest people live. This push 
continúes, and peripheral people are at the same time becoming more vocal and active, using self-
help to attract services. Unfortunately buildings do not ensure efficient services. For example, 
there is a strong bias against small villages in the proportion of trained teachers and in 
performance in examinations. T h e situation was improved by A R D P construction of classrooms, 
but teachers' quarters do not appear a major attraction to induce trained teachers to work in the 
remoter areas, especially as Councils' rents are high compared with private rents. Apparently 
because of high rents, about half the 190-odd teachers' quarters built under the A R D P in Central 
District are standing empty. 
T h e Plan objective, that "All Batswana, wherever they live and whatever their social 
background, should have equal access to services that the Government provides — such as 
education, health and water supplies" requires a positive bias towards the poorer people and the 
remoter areas. This has implications for both staffing and paying for services. Concerning 
staffing, a new approach may be needed, including perhaps a period of national service and also 
special incentives. Concerning paying for services, access to education, health services, and 
water would be made more equitable if charges for them were abolished in the rural areas. T h e 
poor and the very poor would benefit and social justice would be served. 
T h e speed and priority of the A R D P had both costs and benefits. On the cost side, financial 
expenditure was higher than it would have been, especially with the programme for major roads 
through villages and with construction carried out by big contractors; some outcomes were bad 
because of lack of local consultation, of inappropriate designs (prefabricated buildings, school 
furniture etc.), and of problems of supervisión; and there was a bias towards what could be clone 
quickly to the neglect of types of programme needing more care and patience. On the benefit side, 
it is difficult to separate benefits from speed from benefits from the programme as a whole. 
Facilities were often ready for use years earlier than they would have been. Services were pushed 
further out into the rural areas. Government capacity to implement was lifted onto a new plateau. 
T h e priority of rural development carne to be better appreciated in Government, especially 
among urban-biased technical officers. Developmental changes were forced indirectly through 
the chain of bottlenecks created by the ARDP. Procedural innovations were made. Government 
and Councils gained in confidence and credibility. One major lesson of the A R D P is that strong 
political leadership and a sense of urgency can forcé and enable the civil service to do more, more 
quickly and better, than wise and prudent men might advise to be possible. 
This selective evaluation of the A R D P is more favourable than the writer expected. Much was 
achieved and does not now have to be repeated. But development is not bricks and mortar. It is 
one thing to construct. It is another, and harder, to ensure that services are well staffed, operate 
well, and are accessible to all. It is yet harder to achieve the national aim of an equitable 
distribution of income when so many of the poorest people are precisely those who are furthest 
away, least well educated, worst informed, least in contact with government, and least able to help 
themselves. T h e A R D P was a step towards them but only on one front. T h e main frontier and the 
main challenge seem now to lie in the much harder task of ensuring that economic growth means 
better lives not just for those rural people who are more able to help themselves, but specifically 
for those who are poorer, weaker, and less capableof taking advantageof opportunities; for those, 
in short, who tend to get left behind and left out. 
Lessons can be drawn from the A R D P experience and suggestions made for ihe future. These 
are: 
1. Concerning infrastructure: 
(i) avoiding crash programmes with big contractors 
(i) monitoring building programmes 
(iii) taking care over designs 
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2. Concerning implementing capacity: 
(i) building up staff before any large programme 
(ii) using District Councils to undertake construction for Government departments 
(iii) making block grants to District Deveiopment Committees 
(iv) pursuing devolution to District Councils and to government staff at the local level. 
3. Concerning management procedures: 
(i) making management procedures a focus for attention, especially in ministries where 
implementation lags. 
(ii) using locally available management expertise for the collaborative design, testing and 
introduction of such procedures 
(iii) introducing a povertv ranking in the project identification ancl appraisal process. 
4. Concerning political leadership: 
(i) galvanising the civil service into action for priority programmes 
(ii) enabling Ministers to direct and review performance in their Ministries. 
5. Concerning the poorer people in the rural areas: 
Mounting a programme for promoting rural equity. This programme, set in the 
framework of the Fourth National Deveiopment Plan, would, like the ARDP, provide 
support and Ímpetus to existing and new projects. These Projects would be selected and 
designed to focus and accelerate the provision of access to resources, incomeopportunities 
and services, to the more disa.dvantaged people within the rural sector. 
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1. The ARDP In Outfine 
ORIGINS AND O B J E C T I V E S 
1.1 T h e origins and objectives of the Accelerated Rural Deveiopment Programme (ARDP) can be 
understood against the background of the Botswana policies for national and rural deveiopment. 
The fundamental objectives of the National Deveiopment Plan 1973-78 included: to secure the 
lastest possible rate of economic growth in a manner designed to raise the living stands of the great 
mass of the inhabitants of Botswana; to maximise the number of new job opportunities; and to 
promote an ecjuitable distribution of income, in particular, by reducing differentials between the 
urban and rural sectors through rural deveiopment (NDP 3:xi). T h e Plan left no doubt about the 
priority attached to rural deveiopment. It notecl that: 
"Over 90 per cent of the population live in the rural areas, and at least 70 per cent (45 000) are 
attached to traditional farming house holds. T h e average per capital rural income in 1971/72 
was estimated at R50 per annum including remittances received from relatives in wage 
employment. However, living standards will vary greatly depending on the agricultural 
season. This average, low as it is, disguises the extent of rural poverty, which for the majority 
is extreme. T h e urgent challenge faced in this Plan is to alleviate this poverty. T h e 
Government is concerned not only to increase rural incomes, but also to improve basic social 
services and generally to raise the quality of life in the rural areas." (NDP 3: 41). 
The strategy to be followed was to secure rapid and large returns from capital investment in 
mining and to invest a large proportion of the resulting revenues in "the improvement and 
expansión of social services and infrastructure in the rural areas and in the creation of income 
generating activities in the rural areas" (NDP 3:58). 
1.2 T h e ARDP was not originally part of the Plan, although it incorporated many of the rural 
Projects put forward in it. It was, rather, a programme conceived and executed very largely to 
speed up the implementation of what was already proposed. It resulted from a Cabinet decisión in 
November 1973. That decisión itself can be interpreted in the light of four factors. 
1.3. First, funds were becoming a much less serious constraint. The last support for the recurrent 
budget received from the UK was R1.9 million in 1971/72. In 1972/73 Botswana had for the first 
time achieved recurrent budgetary self-sufficiency. T h e Deveiopment Plan 1973/78 projected 
Table 1.1 : Projected Surpluses of Revenue over Recurrent 
Expenditure 1973/74 through 1977/78 in Pula millions 
Reccurent budget 
Domestic revenue 
Recurrent budget 
surplus 
1973/4 1974/5 1975/6 1976/7 1977/8 Total 
28.6 32.7 37.1 42.4 48.3 189.1 
37.7 44.2 45.6 50.5 56.1 234.1 
9.1 11.5 8.5 8.1 7.8 45.0 
Source: NDP 73-78 - Table 4.6 
The Government had, thus, for the first time the prospect of funds which it could use completely 
at its own discretion. In addition programmes of grant financing for rural schools and health 
facilties were being negotiated with SIDA and NORAD respectively. Whatever other problems 
there might be, lack of funds certainly was not likely to be the most serious constraint on the 
creation of new rural infrastructure. 
1.4. Second, the need for rural infrastructure was acute and becoming more so. T o take 
but one example, the position of rural schools, far from improving, had been steaclily 
cleteriorating. In primary schools the excess of classes over classrooms went up from 526 
in 1968 to 758 in 1972. In 1973 the situation was aggravatecl by a sharp increase of 17 per cent 
in total primary school enrolments, from 82,000 in 1972 to 96,000 in 1973. 1100 new cbssrooms 
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would be needed by 1978 if all classes were to be housed. T h e Plan, perhaps basing its projections 
on the disappointing performance of self-help which produced only 438 rooms in 1968-1972, 
targetted for 700 new classrooms by 1978. More generally, it noted that "While the Government 
regareis the achievement of an effective programme of rural development as its greatest challenge 
during the Plan period, it recognises the problems inherent in the execution of this policy" and 
added drily "Experience since Independence with the difficulties of implementing small 
construction and other rural improvement projects indicates that dramatic progress cannot be 
expected." (NDP 3:41) 
Table 1.2: Numbers of Primary School Classes and Classrooms 
1968-1972 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
Number of classes 1767 2015 2254 2412 2437 
Number of classrooms 1241 1305 1442 1519 1679 
Classes without Classrooms 526 710 812 893 758 
Source: NDP 73-78: 99-table 7.12 
1.5. Third, by the second half of 1973, quiet but important institutional developments had taken 
place or were in hand. A Rural Development Unit, reporting direct to the Vice-President, and 
with considerable potential for coordination, had been set up in the Ministry of Finance and 
Development Planning. District Development Committees had been established and had already 
gained experience. District Plans, including plans for rural infrastructure, hael been drawn up 
and incorporated in the National Plan. A crucial decisión had been taken in 1972 to reinforce the 
District level planning and implementing cadre with volunteers to fill posts as District Officers 
(Development), Council Planning Officers, Council Works Superintendents, and Council 
Building Supervisors. For some of these positions volunteers were already in post. Other were in 
the pipeline so that later, by May, 1975, the Unified Local Government Sei'vice had 67 expatríate 
staff, mainly volunteers, from Cañada, Denmark, Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom and 
the United States. In these various ways, some of the machinery for a more vigorous programme 
of rural development had already been created or was in the process of being created. 
1.6. In the event, however, a fourth factor was decisive in determining the timing and nature of 
the ARDP. In his introduction to the Plan, the Vice-President had stated that "Botswana now has 
resources to undertake a major assault on the problems of the rural areas. T h e basic planning has 
been done anel the revenue is available. Beginning in 1973, the programme of action should move 
into top gear." (NDP 3: xi). The sense of opportunity and urgency was heightened by a general 
awareness that the Government had not yet been able to achieve dramatic, tangible results in most 
of the rural areas where the great majority of the people lived, and by the steady approach of the 
date in October 1974 when the electorate would pass their verdict on the Government's 
performance. There was thus a growing demand for decisive and effective action on the ground. 
1.7. Against the background of these four factors — the availability of funds, the need for rural 
instrastructure, the building-up in the capacity to implement, and the political accountability of 
the Government, a programme to speed up rural projects can be seen as a logical outeome. At a 
Cabinet meeting on 23 November 1973, the President directed that the Ministry of Finance and 
Development Planning should produce proposals within one week for an accelerated programme 
for rural development projects for 1974, the primary objective being for projects to be visible, on 
the ground, by a target date of 30 September 1974. Urgent meetings were called by the 
Coordinator of Rural Development. Ministries were given 48 hours in which to produce 
proposals. Ministries varied widely in the extent to which they were willing or able to put 
proposals down on the table at such short notice. As it later worked out, it was the Ministries of 
Local Government and Lands, of Works and Communications, and of Mineral Resources and 
Water Affairs, which provided the bulkof the projects in the programme, with a much lower level 
of participation by the Ministry of Agriculture. 
1.8. At first a wide range of projects were, albeit briefly, considered. T h e Ministry of Local 
Government and Lands proposed a long list of visible projects involving building, most of which 
were accepted and which will be described and discussed below. It also proposed four "invisible" 
projects variously aimed at the poorer rural people and designed to raise rural productivity. T h e 
four projects were: 
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(i) the abolition of the mínimum (R3) local government tax 
(ii) the provision of food for 3,000 chronically destitute families 
(iii) cash to replace food for 10,000 workers in the food for work programme 
(iv) higher pay for 300 village project leaders in charge of the food for work projects. 
These projects, especially the first two, appear to have conformed closely with the Government's 
aims of attacking rural poverty and redistributing incomes to the poorest; but not only were they 
not visible but, more importantly, they involved major questions ofpolicy, debating which would 
have complicated and delayed the programme. They do not appear to have been seriously 
considered. Speed required simplicity. T h e purpose of the ARDP carne to be defined as to give 
priority to certain items of rural infrastructure which would serve as the focus and catalyst of 
further rural deveiopment, as well as providing visible evidence to the people of Botswana of the 
Government's rural deveiopment policies. And visibility carne to mean mainly buildings, roads 
and water supplies. T h e question was what could be done, with what costs and what benefits, by 
30th September, 1974, given that the ARDP was to take priority over all other programmes and that 
finance was for this programme nothing like as serious a constraint as it has been in the past. 
S T R A T E G Y AND COMPONENTS 
1.9. T h e main constraint was the administrative capacity to plan, design and implement. T h e 
strategy adopted was to divide villages into 27 larger villages and some 195 smaller villages. Works 
in the larger villages were to be undertaken exclusively by big contractors. Buildings in these 
larger villages were to include school buildings, teachers' houses, offices, and council and staff 
quarters and were to besupervised by the Chief Architect's Office in the Ministry of Works. Roads 
were to be tarmacked in eight of the largest villages — Maun, Palapye, Serowe, Mahalapye, 
Mochudi, Molepolole, Ramotswa, and Kanye — and were to besupervised by the Roads Branchof 
the Ministry of Works. Works in the smaller villages were to be undertaken by District Councils or 
by contractors hired by them. District Councils were expressly forbidden to undertake any 
construction work in the larger villages, or even to complete work which was already in hand 
there. T h e rationale for these decisions was that implementing capacity was the crucial constraint, 
that big contractors could only be attracted in to the larger villages where there would be better 
facilities and economies of scale in construction, ancl that District Councils, with their detailed 
local knowledge, would have a comparative ádvantage for construction in smaller villages. 
1.10. As it developed, the ARDP was linked to a greater or lesser degree with a rather confusing 
number of projects. These were, however, classified according to their novelty and accorcling to 
the degree to which they were being accelerated. T h e line up in April 1974 was as follows: 
Table 1.3. ARDP-LINKED PROJECTS 
Status 
Cocle 
Nu mber Description Compon ents 
Su bstantial 
accel eral ion LG23/27 Primary School facilities: 
classrooms 
fencing 
toilet blocks 
offices 
teachers' quarters 
LG26 
LG30 
PW41 
Primary School .Stores 
Council ancl Government Staff Housing 
Major Roads through Villages 
Modérate 
acceleration GS02/09 
LG22 
LG20 Boreholes for Village Supplies 
Primary School Equipment 
Equipment 
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Health Care Facilities: health posts 
clinics 
materaity wards 
nurses' houses 
LG09 Council Vehicles 
Little or no LG28 Rural Infrastructure: Industrial Areas 
acceleration water supply 
LG 29 Council/Government Office Blocks 
LG19 Customary Court Offices 
PW35 Rural Roads 
WB17/WB26 Major/Rural Village 
Water Supplies 
WB14 Rural Electricity 
New Projects AG07 Dara Construction 
AG09 Livestock Saleyards 
Source: Rural Development Council Paper 1/74 prepared for the meeting of 13th May 1974. 
PROGRESS COSTS AND ACHIEVEMENTS 
1.11. T h e progress of the main ARDP programmes will be taken up later below. Suffice it here to 
note the broad outlines. Tenders were invited and awarded for construction in the larger villages, 
and also separately for the construction of tarmacked roads in eight of the larger villages. Councils 
adopted various approaches to the challenge of a massively increased construction programme in 
the smaller villages, including labour-only contracts to small contractors (with the Council 
supplying materials and often some supervisión and advice) and to varying degrees direct 
construction by Council Works Units. A critical constraint was removed by bringing forward a 
project to buy new vehicles for Councils. This replaced worn out vehicles and also dramatically 
increased the size of Councils' fleets. By the target date of 30 September 1974 there was something 
to show for the ARDP. Work had begun on building construction in at least 9 of the larger villages. 
Work had begun on the major roads in 7 out of the 8 villages in which they were to be tarmacked. 
In the smaller villages, at the end of July 1974, 61 classrooms had been completed and 122 were in 
progress. Headway had also been made with other programmes. 
1.12. Measured against the targets which had been set, these achievements may appear 
disappointing. But evaluating programmes against their targets can be misleading. It often makes 
sense to set unrealistically high targets as a carrot ancl incentive; by striving for the impossible, 
more may be achievecl. T h e criterion here for evaluating the ARDP should not be the extent to 
which its targets were achieved, but the extent to which more was achieved than would have been 
the case without the ARDP. This must always be a question of difficult juclgement. Moreover, the 
ARDP was extended, first to the end of March 1975, and then to the end of March 1976, by which 
time it had cost a little over 21 million Pula (see table 1.4). By then its achievements were 
substantial and varied. A monitoring system had been introduced withquarterly, ancl later thrice-
yearly reports on progress. Some of the earlier targets had been passed: 9 major villages water 
supplies had been constructed against an original target of 5; 489 classrooms against 400; 425 
teachers' quarters against 400; 29 dams against 20. And some of the original targets had not been 
achieved: only 10 livestock saleyarcl kraals were complete against a target of 18, and only 43 rural 
health posts against 64. But buildings in most of the larger villages had longsince been completed 
as had the improved (tarmac and gravel) major roads in eight of the largest villages. Construction 
in the smaller villages had built up momentum which had since been sustained. T h e monitoring 
system was still operating ancl has continued since. As table 1.5 shows, much else hacl also been 
achieved. 
1.13. As with other innovative and controversial programmes, evaluation was called for, both of 
the component programmes, and of the approach as a whole. T h e evaluation which follows is 
clivided into two sections: the first deals with the main programmes; the seconcl consiclers general 
questions of costs, benefits and impact. 
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Table 1.4. ARDP EXPENDITURE BY YEARS FROM 1973/4 lo 31 MARCH 1976 (PULA) 
% Of Total 
ARDP 
PROJECT MINISTR Y 1973/4 1974/5 1975/6 Total Expenditure 
(Rounded) 
Major/Rural Village Water Supplies MRWA 251,056.4 993,506.8 1,030,687.4 2,275,250.6 
Underground Water Deveiopment MRWA 964 14,493.2 67,967 83,424 
Contad Borehole Drilling MRWA 98,647.2 1,073,289.3 602,239 1,774,175.5 
M R W A S U B T O T A L 350,667.6 2,081,289.3 1,700,893.4 4,132,850 19 
Danis MOA _ 145,892 290,385.9 436,277.9 
Livestock Saleyards MOA — 7,502 50,391 57,893 
MOA Subtotal - 153,394 340,776.9 494,170.9 2 
Local Authority Deveiopment Grants MLGL 384,920 262,718 256,825 904,463 
Tribal Administration MLGL 5,826.8 23,873 5,967.2 35,667 
Basic Health Services MLGL 105,785 776,800 515,475.8 1,398,060.8 
Primary School Equipment MLGL — 338,959 855,775.5 1,194,734.5 
Primary School Improvement and Facilities MLGL 487,072 2,312,523 2,672,738 5,472,333 
Primary School Stores MLGL 52,500 157,620 90,288 300,408 
Rural Industrial Infrastructure MLGL 15,372.5 27,534 _ 42,907 
Integrated Office Blocks MLGL — 8,271 49,786 58,057 
District Council and Administration Housing MLGL — 1,075,707 795,880.7 1,871,587.7 
M L G L S U B T O T A L 1,051,476.3 4,984,005 5,242,736.2 11,278,218.5 53 
Rural Power Supplies MWC 60,000 8,125 _ 68,125 
Rural Roads MWC 124,331 722,699.3 1,134,083.7 1,981,114 
Major Village Roads MWC 64,726 2,126,212.7 1,049,828.3 3,240,767 
M W C S U B T O T A L 249,057 2,857,038 2,183,912 5,290,006 25 
A R D P T O T A L 1,651,209.9 10,075,725.3 9,468,318.5 21,195,245 100 
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2. The Main Programme in Review 
MAJOR ROADS T H R O U G H VILLAGES 
2.1. The programme for major roads through villages was probably the most accelerated and 
most controversial part of the ARDP. It was developed from a more modest proposal (PVV 41) in 
the National Development Plan 1973-78 for improving the through roads in a few of the biggest 
villages. In its first ARDP form it was a proposal to construct 76-79 km oftarmac roads in eight of 
the largest villages — Maun, Serowe, Mahalapye, Mochudi, Kanye, Ramotswa, and Molepolole. 
Ghanzi was considered but ruled out on the ground of excessive cost. In the project memorándum 
of January 1974 the completion date was given as the end of August 1974 and the total estimated 
capital cost as R2.5 million. T h e Ministry of Works hacl been engaged on design for the Mochucli 
and Maun roads for some time but there were no designs for the other villages. Contracts had, 
therefore, to be basecl on a schedule of rates instead of the more common and usually cheaper 
system of a bilí of quantities. Contracts were negotiated mainly with Stirling Astaldi and Fowler 
Construction. T h e construction contract for seven villages went to Fowler who were cheaper, 
while that for the eighth village — Maun went to Bechuana Construction. Supervisión of the 
construction was carried out by three consultan! firms — Sir Alexander Gibb ancl Partners, John 
Burrows ancl Partners, and Brian Colquhoun, Hugh O'Donnell and Partners. T h e Ministry of 
Works had warnecl that it would not be able to provicle cióse supervisión of the consultants. 
2.2. Negotiations revealed that the cost might exceed the estímate by about R1 million. Several 
reasons can be suggested for this. T h e schedule of rates system is more expensive than the bilí of 
quantities since contractors are faced with a higher degree of uncertainty ancl risk, and Ínflate 
their estimates lo cover this. Mobilisation costs, while less significant than for building 
construction, were higher for a series of small jobs than for one larger one. It may well be, however, 
that the mam factor was the weak negotiating position of Government. This suggestion cannot be 
substantiated in detail, but the pressure on the Ministry of Works for rapicl completion combined 
with the inexactness of the schedule of rates approach put the contractors in a strong bargaining 
position. 
2.3. T o reduce costs, economies were made. T h e width of the roads was reduced: the tarmac from 
6.7 metres to 6.0, the edge to shoulder from 0.6 metres to 0.3, ancl the shoulder from 3.0 metres to 
1.51. The total length of tarmac road was rechiced from 76-79 km to 46 km, with 37 km of cheaper 
gravel road. Finally, the normal second chip and spray seal was eliminated so that the roads 
would have only one chip and spray seal. 
2.4. Rapid implementation led to difficulties at the local level. Some district councils were 
irritated that they had not been consulted. In one case, Mochudi, where the Council had already 
worked with a contractor on the North-South road, the experience proved useful. T h e Land 
Board stoocl by at 24 hours notice to deal with issues arising and there was closer collaboration and 
less dissatisfaction there than in some other places. Elsewhere, however, Councils hacl difficulty in 
securing small changes to alignments or to the proposals for which sections should be tarred. Land 
Boards had to work out compensation to those whose houses were demolished. This was 
complicated by the absence of people in the lands. Sometimes the contractors were held up while 
people were fetched from the lands. and standing time hacl to be paicl for their idle equipment. 
Compensation tended to err on the side of generosity. Some Councils which hacl worked out 
compensation at normal rates were irritated to discover that they could have been more generous. 
At Molepolole, in the laconic words of one observer, "there was much consultation which was why 
much compensation was paid." 
2.5. T h e design and construction of the roads also led to widespread complaints from villagers 
and Councils. T h e shortcomings, as they saw it, included: 
— the roads were too narrow 
This narrowness is said to make it clifficult for large vehicles to pass one another. However, as 
traflic usually travels slowly in villages this criticsm loses some of its forcé. In Mahalapye the 
road is narrower than the rest of the North-South road of which it is a part. 
1. These figures are for Serowe ancl are assumed to be the same for the other villages. 
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— the ditches were too deep. 
In the case of Maun, the road had to be raised 6 inches because the borrow for the base course 
was too weak. T o reduce the extra cost, a second base course in stronger material was placed 
on top of it. This raised the road higher above its ditches than intended. Elsewhere 
complaints are common that the ditches are dangerously deep and there have already been 
accidents. On the Paje road in Serowe, women carrying water from the borehole on one side 
of the road to their houses on the other have clifficulty crossing the deep ditches and have to 
put down their loads and help one another. 
— poor access. T h e points of access for vehicles are too narrow ancl too few and sometimes, as at 
Mahalapye, make it difficult to park off the road for shopping. People fill in the ditches to 
provide access. Foot-bridges are also needed. 
— deterioration, T h e edges of the shoulders and of the bitumen are already eroding. In Maun the 
road is breaking up, perhaps partly because of the custom of dragging 44 gallón drums full of 
water behind donkeys along the surface. 
2.6. Vocal protests ancl conspicuously visible errors are liable to draw attention away from the 
very substantial benefits brought by these roads. T h e tarmac reduces dust. T h e roads are 
appreciated by vehicle owners. Their economic benefits can be related to the amount of traffic 
they bear. T h e I B R D appraisal of the Palapye-Serule stretch of the North-South road is reported 
to give an internal rate of return of 11-12 per cent with a traffic growth rate of 8-10 per cent per 
annum and a current daily traffic density of only 110 vehicles a day. T h e Roads Branch of the 
Ministry of Works usually assumes that 130 vehicles a day justifies tarring a road. However, road 
traffic in the villages in question is much higher than this, perhaps usually between two and three 
times as high. Traffic counts are not normally made inside villages, but for Maun in September 
1973 they varied between 175 and 395 vehicles per day, towards the end of the tourist season. More 
generally in Botswana the past three years have seen a sharp rise in vehicle registrations. (see 
Table 2.1). From 1973 to 1975 the increase in the number of motor vehicles licensed was 42 
per cent for the villages in the major roacls programme and 60 per cent for Botswana as a whole. 
For all these reasons it seems likely that all normal costs a strict economic evaluation of the 
programme for major roads through villages would come out very favourably. 
Table 2.1.: 1973-1975 Increase in the Number of Prívate Vehicles 
Licensed in the Villages Receiving Roads 
1973 1975 "/olncrease 
Mahalapye 
Palapye 
Ramotswa 
Kanye 
Maun 
Maun 
Serowe 
Molepolole 
838 
186 
188 
172 
294 
285 
103 
45 
817 
348 
430 
263 
372 
481 
163 
132 
- 3 
87 
129 
53 
27 
69 
58 
193 
2111 3 006 42 
2.7. T h e costs were, however, unusually high. T h e cost history of the major roads through 
villages is summarised in table 2.2. 
Table 2.2.: Cost History of the Major Roads Through Villages 
KM 
Estimated 
Cost in Pula 
(Rounded) 
Cost per 
km in Pula Date Detail tar gravel total 
10. Jan 74 Project 
Memorándum 
76-79 76-79 2,500,000 c.32,000 
Jan/Feb 74 After Negotiation 76-79 76-79 c.3,500,000 c.45,000 
Feb. 74 After reduction of 
specifications 46 57 83 2,704,320 c.32,600 
Nov. 76 As paid up to 
Nov. 1976 48,9* 29,3* 78,2* 3,240,767 41,400 
Nov. 76 As claimed by 
contractors ancl 
Consultants 48,9* 29,3* 78,2* 4,519,950 57,800 
Dec. 76 Final Settlement 48.9* 29.3* 78.2* 3,420,767 43,700 
*These are the lengths to be constructed under the December 1974 amendment to the contract. 
2.8. Some of the main reasons for the rises in costs were: 
(a) external (i.e. unrelated to the way the project was undertaken) 
— claims for delays because of weather conditions. 
— rise in POL prices . 
— statutory rise in wages in mid-1974l . . . . , n c c n n m . , , c . ' . , ° ¡— an additional P65U.000 was estnnatecl lor these. 
— rises in material costs 
(b) internal (i.e. related to the way the project was undertaken) 
— cost of consultan ts for design and supervisión instead of using MOW (about 10 per cent 
of the total) 
— cost of more expensive solutions Hable to arise from Consultants' decisions when 
working without MOW Supervisión. 
— standing time for equipment when construction was held up in order to settle 
compensation matters. 
— high compensation rates paid lo those whose properties were affected. 
— costs of schedule of rates approach instead of bilí of quantities. 
— mobilisation overheads for small jobs 
— more and larger culverts than at first required. 
2.9. T h e final cost of 43,700 Pula per km, while much lower than the 57,800 Pula claimed, is still 
high. It can be compared with the cost of the Content Farm-Sebele section of the North-South 
road. This length of 3.7 km was started in November 1973 and completed in August 1974. It might 
have been expected to cost more per km than the major roads through villages because (a) over 
one third of the major roads through villages were only improved gravel, and not tarree!, and (b) it 
was wider (6.7 metres of bitumen against 6.0) and had a seconcl chip and spray seal. But on the 
other hand the contract was basecl on a bilí of quantities following design by the MOW and not on a 
schedule of rates. In addition there were no consultants supervisión costs as the MOW provided 
supervisión. T h e original contract was for P90,000 and the final settlement was for P102,000, 
giving a cost of P27,600 per km or only two/thirds of the cost per km of the major roads through 
villages. In other words, the major roads through villages cost half as much again per km as a short 
stretch of the North-South road built to a higher standard. In mitigation, it is true that with the 
major roads through villages the costs of transport must have been higher and the costs of 
mobilisation were almost certainly higher. But even so, it seems a fair conclusión that they cost 
more than they need have clone and that the quality of work was lower than it need have been. 
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Much of the higher cost and lower quality are directly attributable to the speecl with which the 
programme had to be carried out and especially to two factors: first, the negotiated schedule of 
rates contracts; and second, the lack of supervisión of consultants who are paid on the basis not of 
savings which they securebut insteadon the basis of a percentageof final costs, ancl who anyway on 
strictly professional grounds may not opt for lower cost solutions which may be most in the public 
interest. 
2.10. Given the high and rising traffic densities in the villages affected, the programme may have 
been economically justified even at these higher costs. There are, moreover, complicated time 
discount factors, and questions of the opportunity costs of MOW design and supervisión 
capability, which might make the accelerated programme appear more favourable. These factors 
appear unlikely to offset the large sums which coidd probably have been saved with a less rushed 
programme. T h e lesson is clear. Crash programmes of road construction should be avoided. 
T H E C O N S T R U C T I O N OF BUILDINGS 
2.11. T h e scale of the various programmes for the construction of buildings is shown in table 2.3. 
Table 2.3.: ARDP Building Targets and Achievements in the Large and Smaller Villages 
Figures in brackets indicate numbers reported completed as at 31 March 1976) 
Larger Villages Smaller Villages Target Total 
Classrooms 178(184) 338(305) 516(489) 
Teachers' houses 176(182) 253(243) 429(425) 
Storerooms 31(30) 67(n. a.) 98(n. a.) 
School offices 9(n.a.) 28(n.a.) 37(n.a.) 
Latrines 490(490) 52(106) 542(596) 
Clinics 7(7) 22(14) 29(21) 
Health Posts - ( 1 ) 62(42) 62(43) 
Nurses' Flouses 8(10) 24(20) 32(30) 
Council/Government 
Staff Houses 204(178) 204(178) 
Integrated Office 
Blocks 5(1) — 5(1) 
Note: In addition 5 maternity wards were built in larger villages and 3 in smaller villages 
Sources: "Ministry of Local Government and Lands 1974 ARDP Construction Programme" 
(undated, but about April 1974) for targets. RDU, MFDP for completions. 
Notes: In some cases these figures exceed the original targets. In November 1973, for example, 
the classrooms target was only 400. T h e figures above do, however, represent the 
construction programme envisaged at sometime in the second quarter of 1974 and are 
related to a cletailed village by village breakdown. 
2.12. T h e ARDP has sometimes been described as a building programme. This is misleading, but 
the construction of buildings in the larger and smaller villages dicl account for over 9 million of 
the 21 million Pula spent on the ARDP, amounting to 43 per cent of the total. A breakdown is 
given in table 2.4. 
Table 2.4: Principal ARDP Expenditures on the Construction of Buildings up to 31 March 1976 
Pula Percentage of total 
Tribal administrative/customary ARDP expenditure 
courts 35,667 0,2 
Basic Health services 1,398,060 6,6 
Primary School Improvement 
and facilities 5,472,333 25,8 
Primary school stores 300,408 1,4 
Integrated Office Block (Tsabong) 58,057 0,3 
District Council and 
Administration Housing 1,871,587 8,8 
Total buildings 9,136,112 43,1 
Total ARDP expenditure 21,195,245 100 
Sources: Coordinator of Rural Development's Circular Savingram FDP. 13/5/1 of 27th August, 
1976. 
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2.13. T h e strategy for the unprecedented volume of construction intended was to give all work in 
the 27 larger villages to big contractors supervised by the MOW while District Councils were to be 
responsible for all construction in the smaller villages. T h e rationale was that big contractors 
would be needed if the work was to be completed in time and that they would only contémplate 
ancl be attracted by the greater volume of work that would be available in the larger villages ancl 
that District Councils, with their local knowledge, would have a comparative advantage in the 
smaller villages. Moreover it was felt that unless the District Councils were forbidden to 
undertake work in the larger villages, they would go on concentrating there, to the continuing 
neglect of the more distant smaller villages. 
Construction in the Larger Villages 
2.14 As big contractors had never before worked in the rural areas away from the line of rail and 
had no experience of them, the MOW anticipated difficulty in attracting them to bid. Permission 
was given by the Central Tender Board for negotiated contracts but in the event these were not 
necessary as there was competition. Details of water supplies and sources of building materials 
locally available were obtained by the MOW ancl included in the tender documents. Because of 
problems with water and building materials, it was decided to invite tenders for prefabricated 
construction in some villages. T h e villages were grouped for the purposes of tendering. T h e 
tenders received are shown in table 2.5. As table 2.5 shows the contracts were awarded to the lowest 
bidders. T h e contracts for conventional construction were awarded to Minestone and three of the 
four prefabricated contracts to Modular Construction, a Zambia-based firm which carne in and set 
up a small factory in Gaborone to make up its components. 
Table 2.5.: Tenders Received for the Larger Villages Building Construction Programme. 
(Pula) 
CONTRACTAREA 
Bidder Conventional Construction Prefabricated 
~ T 1 T2 T 3 ~ P1 P2 P3 P4 
Botoka 657,453 
Botswana Engineering 
Construction " 768,043 77,453 896,360 
Insulation Equipment 800,221 758,000 517,582 968,247 
Italtswana 771,457 744,260 
Master Builders 729,160' 536,807! 
Minestone (Botswana) 485,7622 610,802* 567,775 
Modular Design — 
Construction ' 572,244 560,575 506,761 855,618 
T h e tenders accepted are unclerlined. 
1 A 12V2 reduction was offered for construction in precast concrete 
2 P25,000 reducation was offered ii T I and T2 were awarded together. 
Note: T h e clusters of villages were: 
T I Mochudi, Tlokweng, Ramotswa 
T2 Kanye, Moshupa, Mmathethe 
T3 Tonota, Palapye, Bobonong, Mmadinare 
P1 Molepolole, Gabane, Lentsweletau, Letlhakeng 
P2 Goodhope, Thamaga, Mabutsane, Manyana, Ranaka, Mmankgodi 
P3 Hukuntsi, Tshane, Kang, Lebututu, Lokgwabe 
P4 Tutume, Mahalapye 
2.15. T h e bids for P3, the Northern Kgalagadi area, were consiclered excessive. A special 
Kgalagadi Works Unit of the Kgalagadi District Council was established. A Government officer 
was seconded to manage the Unit, especially in financial matters, due to lack of capacity in the 
Council. Against a M2 estímate of P145 from Master Builders, the Unit estimated it would be able 
to build for P112M2, but this latter figure involved inclirect subsidies in the formof some overhead 
costs borne by Government, (costs of three Government officers, use of Government Accounting 
Units, etc,). Both estimates were made before the wage increases ancl other rises in costs. Transport 
and materials tenders were submittecl to the Central Tender Board and the transport contract was 
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awarded to Speedy Lines Holding, while Continental Engineering, Johannesburg, received the pre-
fabricated materials supply contract. Volunteers recruited to assist in the work turned out to be 
generally unsuitable and it was necessary to go back to Central Tender Board to obtain authority 
for the Works Unit to sub-contract the erection of the buildings. This was agreed and Speedy Lines 
Holding was also chosen as the erection sub-contractor. 
2.16. In the whole of the larger villages programme, construction began first and was completed 
first in the Northern Kgalagadi. This was largely aresult of the energy and enterpriseof the officer 
in charge ancl of the efficiency of the contractor, and in spite of the considerable administrative 
and logistical problems of the operation. Over 4,300 M2 of buildings were put up by a work forcé 
compring only six foremen-artisans from Eastern Botswana and up to 150 locally recruited 
persons, initially largely unskilled and including some 20 women who worked as painters. 
2.17. In other areas, work began in July and August 1974 ancl was mostly completed in 1975. By 
December 1976 all work was complete and handecl over except for Mabutsane and some minor 
details at Bobonong. 
2.18. Many problems aróse. Reservations were expressed about the prefabricated buildings made 
and put up by Modular. Maintenance appears to be impossible without dismantling most of a 
building. Spare panels are not available, ancl not likely to be as Modular was in liquidation 
towards the end of 1976. At one stage the Ministry of Local Government ancl Lands endeavoured 
to get the contract with Modular terminated but this move was unsuccessful. Occupants of the 
Modular prefabs complain that they (the prefabs) shake in the wind, that strips tear off, that the 
kitchens are small, ancl that there is no store for food. A more general problem aróse over 
sanitation. Aqua privies were installed on the assumption that occupants would be able to pour 
water down them. However, when potential occupants discovered that if they hacl piped water 
they woidd have to pay much higher rents, they prolested ancl plumbingwas either not put in, or, 
where it had been put in, taken out again. Some houses therefore now have aqua privies, but no 
water. T h e matter has attracted keen interest, and has been clebated in the National Assembly. 
Sanitation in larger villages is important and the ARDP did not provide asatisfactory solution for 
many of the staff houses. 
2.19. Costs rose. The estimates following the acceptance of tenclers were no less than 54% higher than 
those calculaled by the MOW in the project memorándum, as shown in table 2.6. T h e contractors' 
case for these costs rests heavily on their ignorance of conditions in the villages. As a prudent (and 
potentially profitable) precaution they padded their bicls. At the same time they were not 
clesperate for work. The South Alrican construction sector was still quite ebullient and 
contractors take work where it pays best. There is also the imponderable question of the extent to 
which the tenders were competitive. Minestone's tender was for Pl,648,000, less by P521,000 than 
its nearest competitors. Modular's tenders for Pl, P2 and P4 carne to 1'1,988,000, less by P509,00 
than its nearest competitors (apart from Master Builders' precast concrete bicl). On the one hand, 
this appears to save the Government over Pl million. Bul on the other hand one cannot but 
wonder how much lower the bids might have been had competition been keener. In the event, 
some of the padeling was neecled to offset unforeseen losses, bul ihe agreemenls protected the 
contractors against many risks and cost rises (such as risos in wages ancl materials) which were 
passed on to the Government. 
Table 2.6.: Cost Escalalion of the Construction Programme in the Larger Villages 
Project Post-tender 
ITEM memo revisecl Per cent 
estímate estímate Increase 
Primary School Facilities 1,867,500 3,043,500 63 
Primary School Stores 69,000 115,500 67 
Clinics and Health posts 323,400 388,800 20 
Government/Council housing 1,380,600 2,050,800 49 
Total 3,640,500 5,598,600 54 
Source: "Accelerated Rural Developmenl Programme 1974 Status Repon and Evaluation," 17 
December 1974, Schedule VI 
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CONSTRUCTION IN T H E SMALLER VILLAGES 
2.20. Construction in the smaller villages was the responsibility of District Councils. 
T h e selection of projects by Councils was simplified by the existence of District plans. 
Whatever the criteria used for selection in drawing up these plans, the ARDP selection 
was usually carried out in an acl hoc common sense fashion without detailed analysis of 
criteria such as pupil-teacher ratios. In the case of Central District, the main criterion appears to 
have been wide ancl fairly standard distribution: 3 teachers' quarters were targetted for each of the 
47 smaller villages in which teachers' quarters were to be built. In general, and especially in the 
other, smaller, Districts, Councils were in a position to use their local knowledge to make what 
were probably fairly souncl decisions differentiated in terms of need. 
2.21. Councils' programmes were implemented in two main ways: by Councils' Works Units; and 
by small contractors who provided and organised labour, with the Council providing materials, 
transport, and often supervisión. 
2.22. T h e Councils' Works Units were generally slow and expensive. At both Malatwana and 
Matebele, in Kgatleng District it took a Council Works Unit about five months to complete a stagé 
II teacher's quarter. At Tsabong, a Council team of 7 to 8 men is saicl to have taken between 6 and 8 
months to put up a block of two classrooms. Slow construction can be explained in terms of 
Councils' inability to pay bonuses or to adopt piece work rates, by reluctance to dismiss ineffective 
labour, by problems of material supply, by poor supervisión, and by workers' appreciation that 
they would be paid whether they worked or not. Costs tended to be high. Workers were paid at 
least the statutory basic minimum wage to which might be addecl variously a per night subsistence 
allowance, a local allowance, ancl a housing allowance, and were paid whether they were working 
or not. There may have been isolated exceptions; but in general Councils' Works Units were 
ineffective and costly. 
2.23. With small contractors' labour-only contracts, performance was mixed. There are accounts 
of small contractors who failed, who took a long time, or who built badly. Of one it was said 'He is a 
good builder, but fantastic slow.' T h e contractors themselves hacl clifficulties with unpredictable 
or late deliveries of materials by Councils, ancl with the supply of sand ancl stone by local 
communities. Their labour costs were, however, less than those of the Councils: they could pay by 
piece work, could pay below the statutory minimum wage (perhaps less than a third of the 
Council's gross daily payments to labourers), ancl coulcl take on and lay ofl labour even on a half 
day basis so that they were less penalised by bacl weather or delays in the delivery of materials. A 
calculation made in Tsabong suggests that for one type of project, a small contractor's labour costs 
would be only 4% per cent of those of the Council (P1746 against P3750, which includes a nights 
allowance). 
2.24. The achievements of the building programme in the smaller villages took many people, 
including the Councils themselves, by surprise. Al first there was a great deal of scepticism about 
what could and would be done. This was justified to the extent that the original target clates were 
highly optimistic. T h e targets ancl achievements are shown in table 2.7. 
Table'2.7.: Smaller Villages Construction Targets ancl Achievements 
Target Completed by Completed by 
to 30.9.74 30.9.74 31.3.76 
Classrooms 338 82 305 
Teachers' houses 253 31 243 
Storerooms 67 9 n.a. 
School Offices 28 2 n. a. 
Toilets 52 13 106 
Clinics 22 3 14 
Health posts 62 6 42 
Nurses' houses 24 2 20 
Source: Ministry of Local Government and Lands 1974 ARDP Construction Programme 
date) Programme source for targets. 
RDU, Ministry of Finance ancl Deveiopment Planning for achievements by 31.3.76. 
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Contractors and Costs 
2.25. There has been considerable discussion about the relative costs of construction in the larger 
and smaller villages, ancl as between different sizes of contractor, different types of contract, ancl 
direct construction by Councils. This is a huge subject. One tentative evaluation has stated, with 
reservations, that the average construction cost per square metre in the larger villages was P147 as 
against P56 in the smaller villages1 and that the villages programme thus appearecl to be 2V2 
to 3 times as expensive as the smaller villages programme. This finding is the more remarkable 
since the transport cost for the smaller villages might be expected to be rather higher than lor the 
larger villages, ancl larger village construction should benefit from economies of scale. 
2.26. There are, however, offsetting reasons for believing that this comparison of costs is 
misleading and should be carefully hedged with qualilications. T h e most important concerns the 
many ways in which the true costs lo Government, Councils and communities of construction in 
the smaller villages were understated, whether work was undertaken by labour-only constractors or 
by Councils' Works Units. Councils often proviclecl labour-only contractors with supervisión, 
transport, ancl cement-mixers without costing these or making a charge. Where Councils carried 
out construction directly through their Works Units, many costs, including ones like these, were 
carriecl on existing recurrent votes and attributed directly to particular items of construction. It 
is not surprising that the expenditure of Works Departments, including transport, for the four 
Councils for which complete figures are available (table 2.8) indicates very sharp increases over the 
ARDP period. It is likely that much of the expenditure incurred under these votes was related to 
rural construction but not attributed to the costs of the buildings, at least in the earlier years. Other 
"subsidies" include bricks produced by the Food for Work programme, saicl to be available in 300 
villages, some self-help which was generally patchy or non existent, except in the North East 
District, and simply the speed with which "estimates" were preparecl, evidence of which comes 
from cost overruns recouped as part of the 1975/6 budgets. In these circumstances, it is difficult to 
know from the books the true unit costs to Councils of construction in the small villages. 
Table 2. 8.: District Con ncils' Works Dep1 artment Expenditures1 
District 
Council 1972 1973-42 1974-5 1975-6 
Kweneng 13,000 20,800 34,000 121,000 
Southern 10,000 28,800 31,000 138,000 
North-East 4,000 5,200 12,000 33,000 
Kgatleng 10,000 14,240 33,000 
T O T A L 37,000 69,040 110,000 340,000 
Percentage increase 
over previous year n.a. 87 59 209 
1 Including transport but not including water supply or roads recurrent costs. 
2 T h e 1973-4 figures are expenditures for the 15 months accounting period which resulted from a 
change in the financial year, multiplied by 12/15 to average the figures to one year. 
2.27. Some attempt is, however, made in appendix B to present comparable costs for a block of two 
classrooms. A block of two classrooms was selected for the comparison since this was a major ancl 
common element in both the larger and smaller villages programmes. But the comparability is far 
from exact. A strict ancl fair evaluation would require much professional work. In the case of the 
District Councils figures (under D in appendix B) it is not known what hidden subsidies there may 
have been (except for Central District) ancl in the case of the Central District estimates it is not 
known what element was allowed for contractors' profits. If a statement is requirecl, it is probably 
true that the M2 cost to Government ancl Councils was higher in the larger villages than in the 
smaller villages, ancl it may have been about twice as much. 
1 Acceleratecl Rural Development Programme 
1974 Status Report ancl evaluation : 4 
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2.28. In considering the big contractors ancl the costs in the larger villages, two questions have lo 
be disentangled. T h e first is whether the big contractors had to face higher costs than smaller 
contractors and were therelore bound to be more expensive; ancl the seconcl is whether the big 
contractors inthe ARDP made the big proíits. 
2.29. First, the big contractors in this case faced higher costs, including: 
— headquarters overheads 
— mobilisation costs 
— costs of expatriate supervisión 
— a higher wage bilí, (having to pay the statutory minimum wage and overtime rates 
whereas small contractors usually get away with paying very much less) 
— possibly higher design standards than in the smaller villages 
— almost certainly, higher completion standards required at the lime of handover. 
They also knew little about the environment in which they were to work ancl thus felt themselves 
subject to high risk. 
2.30. Second, it is not knowable without very detailed investigation what proíits were made by the 
big contractors. Modular Construction went into liquidation which may speak for itself. 
However, it is likely that in biclding for any future contracts, big contractors may be able to benefit 
from the experience gained and thus to reduce the costs in real terms to Government ancl District 
Councils. They would in any case probably have to as this sector has become much more 
competitive than it was when the ARDP bids were put in. 
2.31. In the smaller villages the choice was ancl remains between Councils Works Units and small 
and médium local contractors. 
2.32. The small and médium local contractors performed rather better in the ARDP than might 
have been expected. Some went lo the wall; others gained in experience ancl strength. In some 
cases, following a labour-only construction contract, small contractors were able to buy vehicles 
ancl start on more comprehensive work. Councils gained experience of different contractors so 
that those who were more reliable could be selected in future. Prívate clients were also helped in 
their selection, preferring to give work to contractors who had already worked satisfactorily for a 
Council. Tendering for Councils' work became much more competitive. In Kgatleng District 
towards the end of 1976 there were no less than 12 bids for one construction contract put out to 
tender. Some of the basis was laid for the widespread minor housing contruction which 
subsequently went on in major villages. In sum, the ARDP helped to develop a rural construction 
capability which would otherwise not have flowered so soon. 
2.33. In contrast, Councils' Works Units appear to have been generally slow and expensive during 
the ARDP. There may be a case for preserving some Works Units for some repair and 
maintenance lasks and for construction in very remote and difficult areas. In general, however, 
the trencl away from construction by Works Units appears desirable on the grounds of both cost 
and speed and should be continuecl. 
2.34. If future construction in smaller villages should lie mainly or entirely with small ancl 
médium contractors, improvements are possible. First, cheaper and more efficient construction 
can be secured through puttingout to tender bundles of construction in neighbouring villages, as 
is already being done in Central District. Second, the review of Councils' contract procedures 
should leacl to standardisation, which would make biclding much easier especially for médium 
contractors, ancl to more regular ancl frequent payments to contractors as. building proceeds, 
bringing Councils' practice closer to that of Central Government's and reducing contractors' 
liquidity problems. 
2.35. In summary evaluation, the evidence examined suggests that the ARDP achieved and 
provoked much construction that would otherwise have occurred only years later, that the costs 
were sometimes rather high, and that the benefits were not only what was built bul also the 
competitive building capability which was developed and which has enabled rural building to 
continué on a higher platean since the ARDP. T h e creation of this capability can be considered 
one (though only one) of the necessary córner stones of the national policy of attempting to clirect 
more revenues to the rural areas to benefit the rural population. 
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SCHOOL F U R N I T U R E 
2.36. T h e Thircl National Deveiopment Plan 1973-78 (NDP3) included a project called "Primary 
School Equipment" (LG22) under which it was intended to spend annually P100,000 rising to 
P145,000 over the Plan periocl. T h e project was to supply teaching aids, equipment ancl books. 
T h e ARDP provided both an opportunity and, through the increased number of primary 
classrooms, a need, to expand this project which carne to concéntrate on school furniture. Before 
the ARDP, most school furniture hacl been imported by the District Councils. In 1974, however, as 
part of the ARDP, the Batswana Enterprise Deveiopment Unit (BEDU) became the agent of all 
District Councils for selection of suitable contractors, purchase of material in bulk, and financial 
and physical guidance ancl control of contractors during fabrication. Two contractors were 
selected — Bamalete Engineering in Ramotswa and Serowe Engineering (part of the Brigades) in 
Serowe. T h e contracts negotiated with them were: 
In 1974/5 the classroom sets amounted to 9,000 tables ancl 18,000 chairs. Both Bamalete 
Engineering and Serowe Engineering were forced to tool up for a much higher level of 
production than before and to take on a larger work forcé. Production started in January 1975 on a 
first contract. A second contract (an extensión of the first) was negotiated in June 1975 and in 
October the furniture programme was extended to include items such as blackboards, wooden 
racks and cupboards, all manufactured locally under BEDU auspices. By 31 March 1976, 
expenditure on the programme, which was financed mostly by SIDA, had been about Pl,200,000. 
2.37. On the negative side, the haste with which the programme was mounted allowed 
unsatisfactory designs to be adopted. In particular, tables were produced which could not be used 
for group work. These and other design defects were tackled but only after large numbers of the 
inappropriate items had been produced. 
2.38. On the positive side, the production of school furniture outstripped anything that had been 
envisaged in NDP 3. 90 per cent of the second contract for classroom furniture had been produced 
by 31 March 1976. Local production substituted for imports. Employment was generated and skills 
developed. For example, the steel furniture section of Serowe Engineering was employing, as of 
April 1976, 26 people, 10 of them trainees. 
2.39. T h e school furniture programme was only possible because of the existence of BEDU and of 
the two small engineering companies; what it did was to provide them with an opportunity and to 
galvanise them into action as a result of which they can now stabilise at a higher level of 
employment and production. For the third contract, starting in October 1976, for school clesks and 
chairs, the two producers became completely independent of BEDU and began to handle all 
material procurement and production on their own. 
Numbers of Classroom Sets 
Bamalete Engineering 
Serowe Engineering 
1974/5 
210 
220 
1975/6 
258 
404 
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VILLAGE WATER SUPPLIES 
2.40. Before the ARDP there were four projects included in NDP 3 which were actually or 
potentially concerned with village water supplies. Their respective titles and cost estimates are 
given in tables 2.9. 
Table 2.9.: Cost Estimates of Actually or Potentially Village-Relatecl Water Projects 
(Pula'000) 
Title Cocle 73/74 74/75 75/76 76/77 77/78 Total 
Major Village 
Water Supplies WB17 343 370 380 390 300 1,783 
Rural Village 
Water Supplies WB26 40 90 90 90 90 400 
Underground Water 
Development GS02 94 94 100 100 105 493 
Contract Borehole 
Drilling GS09 312 613 462 — — 1,387 
Totals 789 1,167 1,032 580 495 4,063 
Source: NDP 3 Vol. 2 pp. 107, 114, 242, and 247 
Note: At the time of NDP3, GS02 and GS09 were mainly concerned with borehole drilling for 
cattle posts, not villages. 
2.41. T h e Major Villages Water Supplies Project (WB17) was intended to improve the water 
supplies in 15 large villages with, typically, additional boreholes, pumping equipment, storage 
tanks ancl improvecl reticulation to standpipes. This project appears to have been unaffected by 
ARDP. 
2.42. The Rural Village Water Supplies Projtect (WB26) was directed towards rather small villages, 
but not the smallest since the lowest population limit was taken as 500 persons. It was a modest 
proposal in which, it was saicl, Government would confine its activities to certain basic tasks such 
as equipping borholes ancl installing simple reticulation piping. It did not involve drilling new 
boreholes. Three village projects were to be undertaken on a pilot basis in the first year, ancl 
subsequently it was anticipated that about ten villages a year would benefit from the scheme. 
Funds were available from UNICEF ancl SIDA. 
2.43. T h e Underground Water Development Project (GS02) was for continuing ancl augmenting 
Government's own water drilling capability for all purposes including agriculture ancl industry 
as well as domestic use. 
2.44. The Contract Borehole Drilling Project (GS09) was designed to deal with the backlog of 
borehole applications which at the time when NDP3 was written numbered 304. This figure was set 
beside the successful completion by Government of only 130 boreholes in the previous two 
calendar years. It was proposed to elimínate the backlog ancl to deal with new applications in a 
phased programme over three years. 
2.45. The ARDP hacl no effect on the Major Village Water Supplies Project (WB17) which 
followed its own course largely undisturbed. T h e main impact of the ARDP was on the contract 
borehole drilling project (GS09) and through it, on rural water supplies. There were difficulties 
funding GS09. Donors helcl off for two reasons: first, the project was rather general, ancl vague in 
its objectives; second, clonors were reluctant to support what was in effect a land grab in which 
those who were already better off would establish de facto control ever large areas of land through 
a monopoly of water supply from new boreholes. Domestic funds were thus used for a programme 
which both halted the land grab and provided benefits to many of the poorer people living in 
smaller villages. Complementing this programme, SIDA financed 89 per cent of the cost of the 
major villages ancl rural water supplies programmes which equiped the new boreholes. Contract 
drilling appears to have been reasonably cheap. Accorcling to one informant, bids were very 
competitive and some contracts were let for 7 Pida a metre as against earlier rates of 10 Pula. 
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2.46. A full evaluation is not possible here, but the magnitude of the programmes can be gauged 
from summary expenditure figures in table 2.10. A simple comparison of expenditures and 
deveiopment plan estimates can easily be misleading for reasons too obvious and too numerous to 
elabórate. It may be noted, however, that in the three year period 1973/76 for the projects uncler 
consideration, actual expenditure was P4,132,851 against the plan estímate of P2,988,000 for the 
same period, an excess of 38 per cent. Even after allowing for inllation, this does not appear a 
sector in which the capacity to spend was in the event a major constraint, partly because some of 
the implementing capacity could be bought by contracting out. 
2.47. Data are not available to evalúate the cost-effectiveness of the work done or in any detail its 
geographical distribution. By 31 March 1976, water suppies ancl boreholes were reported 
completed as in table 2.11. 
Table 2.10. Rural Water Supplies: Expenditures 1973/4 through 1975/6 
Projects 
Source of 
Finance 73/74 74/75 75/76 Total 
Major and Rural SIDA 228,734 872,979 914,275 2,015,988 
Village Water UNICEF 8,901 6,728 — 15,629 
Supplies DDF 13,422 113,800 116,413 ,243,635 
Undergrouncl 
Water 
Development UK Devt Loan 964 14,493 67,967 83,424 
Contract Borehole 
Drilling DDF 98,647 1,073,289 602,239 1,774,175 
Totals 350,668 2,081,289 1,700,894 4,132,851 
Source: RDU, MFDP 
2.48. Short of a much fuller evaluation, the following conclusions appear justified concerning the 
ARDP. 
(i) the ARDP did not significantly affect the programme for water supplies in major villages. 
(ii) the ARDP prevented further delay in the contract borehole drilling programme by 
enabling DDF funds to be made available for financing it. 
(iii) the ARDP was instrumental in diverting drilling from new cattle post areas where it would 
benefit those who were already well-off to smaller (i.e. with populations over 500) villages 
where water would benefit more people. 
(iv) water supplies were provided to these villages earlier than would have been the case 
without ARDP. 
Table 2.11.: Village Water Supplies and Boreholes Complete at 31 March 1976 
District 
Water Supplies in 
Large Villages 
Water Supplies in 
Small Villages Total Boreholes 
Kgatleng — 1 21 
Kgalagadi 1 4 7 
Ghanzi 1 2 10 
Northwest 1 1 27 
Central 3 3 38 
Kweneng 2 3 34 
Southeast 2 — 5 
Southern 6 2 36 
Northeast — 2 8 
16 18 186 
Source: Department of Water Affairs, letter of 25 january, 1977 
18 
M I N I S T R Y OF A G R I C U L T U R E PROGRAMMES 
2.49. T h e Ministry of Agriculture had only a small part of the ARDP. Of the expenditure to 31 
March, 1976, the Ministry was responsible for only 2.3. per cent, compared with 19.5 per cent for 
Mineral Resources ancl Water Affairs, 53 per cent for Local Government ancl Lands, and 25 per 
cent for Works ancl Communications. 
2.50. T h e Ministry of Agriculture hacl two projects in the ARDP: dams; and livestock saleyards. 
(a) Dams 
2.51. T h e dams project was inclucled in the ARDP in order to implement a decisión, taken a 
month or two earlier, to reorganise the dam construction programme of the Ministry of 
Agriculture. In ) anuary 1974 the Ministry circulated an outline statement of Government policy 
on haffirs ancl dams ancl the Chief Land Utilisation Officer visited all the District Councils and 
District Development Committees which were affected. Although the policy was clearly set out, 
there appears to have been a communication gap between the Ministry of Agriculture ancl the 
authorities al the local level. At district level, DAOs were left to work out the siting ancl 
administration of dams, while the Ministry set about rebuilcling its construction teams ancl letting 
contracts. On the construction side, changes in sénior staff ancl delays in recruiting supervisory 
staff contributed lo a very slow start: only P146,000 were spent in 1974/5. However, by 31 March 
1976, 29 dams hacl been repairecl or constructed, 8 of these by contract in the North East District 
ancl the remainder by the Ministry's construction units. By then, four construction units were fully 
operational ancl a fencing ancl concreting crew made up a fifth unit. In the districts, DAOs had 
gone ahead ancl found sites by considting farmers ancl communities but the policy ancl its 
implications do not appear to have been fully understood. It was not until April 1976 that the 
Ministries of Agriculture ancl Local Government ancl Lands, at the instance of the Tribal Grazing 
Land Coordinating Committee, made a serious attempt to introduce a system for the selection, 
siting and management of dams. With the dams programme, then, physical targets were achievecl 
about a year late and a start was made, rather belatedly, on establishing a system for siting and 
management. 
(b) Livestock Saleyards 
2.52. In contrast with dam-building which was an existing project, the livestock saleyards project 
was a new idea. T h e proposal was to build livestock saleyards at strategic points, to install 
weighbridges, ancl to organise sales so that cattle owners would get better prices. Auctions were to 
be arranged al which buyers would compete ancl at which owners would have the option of 
withdrawing their animals if they wished. Prices at auction are normally calculated on a live 
weight basis, so the presence of a weighbridge would enable DAOs ancl ADs to advise farmers 
more accurately on the prices they should expect from buyers, as well as assisting the Botswana 
Livestock Development Corporation to determine buying prices at the auctions which it 
organises at Makalamabedi ancl elsewhere in North Western Botswana. Since all auctions are 
licensed by the Ministry of Agriculture, the saleyards coulcl be made the major venues for buying, 
thus improving control ancl surveillance. 
2.53. T h e programme got off to a good start. The Livestock Marketing officer (LMO) in charge 
tourecl District Councils explaining the proposal, discussed it with auctioneers, selected 18 
provisional sites, made financial estimates, drew up a project memorándum, entered into 
correspondence with 6 weighbridge manufacturers, ancl tested two weighbridge models at a site 
near Oaborone. In early 1974 a start was made in confirming sites with Village Development 
Committees and preparing applications to Land Boards. After approval by the Central Tender 
Board, an order was placed for scales from Berkel Africa (Pty.) Ltd. Later in 1974, money was 
warranted for the project. A number of sites were approved ancl some 6 kraals were completed. But 
in September 1974 the LMO in charge left for another posting and the programme lost 
momentum. By December 1976 it hacl been the responsibility of 4 different officers during its 
short life. Further problems were weaknesses in the weighing scales which have hacl to be returned 
and strengthened, lack of continuity ancl el car records in the filing system, ancl difficulties in 
recruiting a good fencing loreman. By December 1976 these problems hacl been largely overcome. 
14 kraals had been completed ancl 4 of these were fully equipped with weighbridges. There 
appeared a good prospect that most of the remainder would shortly be fully equipped. Although 
long delayed, the construction phase was nearing completion. How effective the saleyards would 
be in operation remained to be seen. 
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2.54. T h e experiences and difficulties of the Ministry of Agriculture are a source of lessons. The 
lack of projects to submit to the ARDP in the first place and then the slow implementation of 
projects that followed can be attributed in part to the following factors: 
(i) Low Priority. Neither the dam programme ñor livestock saleyards received consistently 
high priority within the Ministry. T h e dam programme was under something of a cloud 
ancl attitudes towards it were ambivalent, to say the least; ancl the livestock saleyards 
depended largely on the enthusiasm of one officer. Since the Ministry as a whole was not 
involved in a major way in the ARDP, the ARDP label dicl not help these projects much 
within the Ministry. 
(ii) Lack of Staff Continuity. Loss of continuity is sometimes necessary in order to improve 
performance. This was not the case with the saleyards project, where the loss of continuity 
from posting the original LMO in charge led to a serious loss of momentum. 
(iii) Lack of Management System. Unlike the Ministry of Local Government ancl Lands, the 
Ministry of Agriculture dicl not institute a system of target-setting, monitoring ancl 
reporting. T h e original LMO in charge of the sale-yards project clid draw up bar charts, 
but these were never part of a larger system ñor were they maintained after he left. 
(iv) The Nature of Agricultural Programmes. Involving land and local people as they cío, 
agricultural programmes often require patience, especially in the initial negotiations 
and in early operation. (The construction phase, however, is much the same as with other 
types of projects ancl can be improved and speeded up by programming and goocl 
management.) 
(v) Lack of Decentralisation. T h e management of the Ministry of Agriculture is highly 
centralised comparecí with, say, the Ministry of Local Government and Lands. Whereas 
the MLGL had District Councils to which it could clevolve responsibility for much of the 
building construction programme, the Ministry of Agriculture reliecl much more on 
centralised decision-making with Gaborone-based officers making brief field visits. 
(vi) Implementing Capacity the Prime Constraint. In the Ministry of Agriculture implementing 
capacity was more of a constraint than finance. T h e livestock saleyards and the clams 
projects were being undertaken during a period (1973/4-1975/6) when the Ministry was 
only able to spend 30 per cent of its deveiopment budget. There are many imponderables, 
but these two projects may have enabled the staff involved to be more productive than 
they would otherwise have been. 
2.55. In sum, the ARDP highlighted the difficulties experienced by the Ministry of Agriculture 
and the priority of innovations in management to enhance the Ministry's capacity to implement. 
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3. Costs and Effects 
FINANCE AND T H E ECONOMY 
Financial Costs in Perspective 
3.1. The exammation of the programmes for major roads in villages and for the construction of 
buildings in villages suggests that with slower ancl more careful implementation, costs might have 
been lower. T h e costs and benefits of speecl are taken up in paras 3.55-3.58. A less obvious but 
equally important set of issues concerns the valué of funds available to the Government. Since 
money provides the units in which economists and accountants deal, it is easy to miss the point that 
its valué depends on its scarcity or abundance relative to other resources and constraints. Just 
before the ARDP, Botswana had moved into a recurrent budget surplus with the prospect of a 
continuing surplus. Both clomestic revenue and donor funds were likely to be buoyant. Funds 
were then less of a constraint on deveiopment than they had been. That implementing capacity 
was a stronger constraint than funds is indicated by table 3.1 which shows that in the three years 
1973/4 to 1975/6 the Government only managed to spend 67 per cent of its deveiopment budget. 
Table 3.1.: Planned ancl Actual Deveiopment Expenditure 1973/4 through 1975/76 
Planned Actual Actual as 
Ministry /Sector Expenditure Expenditure a Percentage 
P'000 P'000 of Planned 
% 
1. Agriculture 9 600 2 885 30 
2. Commerce, Industry and Tourism 1 704 695 41 
3. Water Affairs and Geological Survey 5 615 5 904 105 
4. Education 11 246 11 941 106 
5. Health 3 247 1 855 57 
6. Roads and Airfields 28 809 18 755 65 
7. Government Infrastructure 8 131 3 771 46 
8. Posts and Telecommunications 4 624 2 951 64 
9. Urban Deveiopment 15 930 9 590 60 
10. Rural Deveiopment, Ministry of Local 
Government ancl Lands 1 765 2 994 170 
11. Miscellaneous 1 212 460 38 
T O T A L 91 883 61 801 67 
Sources: NDP 3; Annual Statements of Accounts 
Notes: 1. All figures have been adjusted to constant 1973/74 prices. '100 in the last column' does 
not necessarily mean that all projects were carried out as original costs were 
frequently underestimated. 
2. 'Government Infrastructure' comprises Government Buildings, CTO, all MFDP 
projects, Printer, Electrical Department, Meteorology, Pólice, Prisons and Justice. 
3. 'Miscellaneous' comprises Museum, Libraries, Information, Broadcasting, Sports. 
4. 'Health' ancl 'Education' include MLGL projects. T h e expenditire rate on primary 
school projects was over 200%; on other education it was arond 50%. 
3.2. There is always a case for the prudent use of Government funds: there are dangers from 
rapidly rising recurrent expenditure, and from "bad habits" such as slack financial control and 
corruption, if Government funds are used without care ancl circumspection. T h e point being 
made here is not that money should be splashed arouncl irresponsibly; it is that it is sane and 
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rational, where not funds but the capacity to use them is the greater constraint, to use money lo 
overcome that constraint. This is precisely what the ARDP did. Any evaluation of the ARDP 
which identifies what appear to be excessive costs must also weigh the fact that domestic ancl donor 
funds were available to help break the bottlenecks of implementation and it was worth paying 
something extra in order to cío this. 
The Use of Domestic and Donor Funcls 
3.3. A further question is whether the urgency of the ARDP meant spending domestic revenue 
where, with a little more time, donor grant finance might have been negotiatecl. A breakdown of 
ARDP expenditure by source is given in appendix C. Given more time, SIDA would quite likely 
have agreed to finance at least some of the 250,000 Pula from the Domestic Development Fund 
(DDF) which was spent on major and rural village water supplies. With both the NORAD 
supported programme for Basic Health Services and the SIDA-supported programme for Primary 
School Improvement, costs were incurred using the DDF in advance of donor funds being 
available, ancl then reimbursed. With the Basic Plealth Services Programme, no clonor funds 
appear to have been foregone. With the Primary School Improvement Programme, the ARDP 
expenditure pattern is shown in table 3.2. 
Table 3.2.: Expenditure and Sources of Funcls for the Primary School Improvement Programme (Pula) 
Source 1973/4 1974/5 1975/6 Total 
SIDA 408,625 646,710 1,751,540 2,806,875 
DDF 78,447 1,594,853 912,158 2,585,458 
WFP - 70,960 9,040 80,000 
SIDA financed the smaller villages programme while the Botswana Government through the 
DDF financed the larger villages programme. This is bound to be a difficult matter to judge, but 
several informed opinions agree that had there been less urgency, and had it been possible to fit 
negotiations in the Swedish budget cycle, SIDA would very likely have been prepared to provide 
grant funds for the whole of the larger villages programme as well. This supposition is borne out 
by the 295,000 Pula which SIDA provided in November 1975 in order to complete the programme. 
Here, then, is a case where it does appear very likely that Botswana domestic funds might have 
been saved. Against this, however, can be set the benefits in long-term support from reserving for 
donors those programmes which are most attractive and in their eyes best valué for money. It may 
have been prudent of the Botswana Government to finance from its own resources two of the 
programmes — major roads through villages, and the construction oí primary school facilties in 
the larger villages — which were most controversia] in terms of cost-effectiveness. 
The ARDP, Development Expenditure, and the Economy 
3.4. The ARDP was launched at a time whcn development expenditure on construction in Botswana 
hacl passed a peak as the Shashe project ancl Orapa carne towards completion. 
Table 3.3. ARDP Expenditures as a Proportion of total Development Expenditures 
Pula 000 
(actual) (actual) (actual) 
ARDP expenditure 
1973/4 
1,651 
1974/5 
10,076 
1975/6 
9,468 
Other development expenditure 28,615 22,708 25,981 
Total development expenditure 30,266 32,784 35,449 
ARDP expenditure as a (rounded) 
percentage of the total 5 31 27 
Sources: Development expendit ure — Annual Statcmcnts oí Accounts. 
ARDP expenditure - FDP 13/5/1 of 27/8/76 
Note: ARDP expenditure is assumed to have been included in the total development 
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expenditure. "Other deveiopment expenditure" is arrived at by subtracting ARDP 
expenditure from total deveiopment expenditure. 
In real terms and taking 1976/77 prices, there was a gradual decline in deveiopment expenditure 
from a peak of P52 million in 72/73 to P48 million in 73/4 and P43 million in 1974/5. This decline 
occurred in spite of the ARDP. It seems that the ARDP was timely in levelling off what would 
otherwise have been a much deeper trough in government deveiopment spending. In the words 
of one economist, the ARDP produced "fantastically a situation where our luck was better than 
our intelligence." 
3.5. It has been suggested that the ARDP overheatecl the construction sector, as shown by.higher 
bids for tenders. One analysis found an underlying rate of inflation of 26 per cent in 1974/75 but 
only a 5 per cent increase in tender prices during the same period, and concluded that at the 
beginning of 1974/75, when ARDP contracts were being let, shortage of capacity in the building 
industry was causing a scarcity premium on tender prices of about 20 per cent. Folkmann, in his 
study of-the building industry in Botswana, commented: 
" from February 1974 to August 1974 prices in Botswana jumped some 28 per cent while 
prices in South Africa increased by about 8 per cent. T h e major part of the extra price increase of 
20 per cent is because labour wage rates were raised by 100 per cent for unskilled and 40 per cent for 
skillecl labour. . . . A minor part (some 8 per cent) of the extra increase could be because the 
Accelerated Rural Deveiopment Programme (ARDP), introduced in spring 1974, created a 
shortage of capacity of the building industry. (The Ministry of Finance evaluated the scarcity 
premium to be 20 per c e n t . . . . This is most probably exaggerated)." (Folkmann 1976: 4.3). 
This order of magnitude (some 8 per cent) is also supported by another recent analysis in the 
MOW. There may well have been a short-lived increase in prices of materials purchased by 
Councils as a result of the demand created by the ARDP, but the ARDP may also have been 
instrumental in attracting to Gaborone a thircl supplier (in addition to J. Haskins and Sons and 
Gaborones Hardware who were already established) in the form of Builders Merchants Botswana. 
T h e increased competition permitted by this Company may have later tended to keep material 
prices down. Further, no informants have suggested that there was any rise in wage rates for 
artisans or unskilled labourers during the period before the statutory increase in wages in mid-
1974. It appears that artisans laid off towards the end of the construction periods in Selebi-Pikwe 
and Orapa were coming onto the market as the ARDP started so that there was no shortage of 
labour supply to drive wages up. In any case, it was not long before there was a general decline in 
South Africa as well as Botswana in the amount of construction being let. The ARDP probably clid 
not overheat the construction sector very much or for very long. 
IMPLEMENTING CAPACITY 
Effects on Other Programmes 
3.6. It is not easy to judge what effect ARDP had on other programmes. It does not seem likely 
that any programme was stopped or held up because funds were diverted to the ARDP since 
funds, as we have seen, were not the main constraint. There were complaints that the 
programming of donor funds was upset. But the programming of donor funds was not a crucial 
bottleneck. There were plenty of donor funds in the pipeline ancl which could not be spent 
because of the constraint of implementing capacity. 
3.7. Ministries, Departments and other organisations fall into two categories: those directly 
involved in ARDP; and those not directly involved. 
3.8. Direct involvement in ARDP tended to mean that other activities were given lower priority 
or abandoned. At the Council level some existing building projects were neglected. In Central 
District at most 10 of the 85 toilet blocks for schools proposed for 1974/5 were actually built 
(through this programme was subsequently overtaken by thewaves of ARDP construction). T h e 
market place for Serowe for which funds were allocated at the end of 1973 still has not been built, 
perhaps partly because of ARDP though there are also other reasons. At the Central Government 
level geological survey work is said to have been held up by the need to site boreholes in villages. 
T h e Chief Architect's Office has been cited as a bottleneck but this may have been exaggerated. At 
the time of the ARDP, two of the projects on which his office was working, and which may be 
presumed to have been delayed, were the High Court for Gaborone and the Magistrate's Court for 
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Francistown. Neither of these has yet been built. Similarly, some of the work in hand in the Roads 
Branch was of rather low priority. There was a delay resulting from ARDP in the design of the 
airstrip at Kasane and in the design of the road from Selebi-Pikwe to Zanzíbar, both low priority 
projects which have still not been implemented. No doubt some programmes were delayed 
somewhat, but the clelay appears to have been either slight or unimportant. T h e main casualties 
were low priority projects which were not likely to be implemented for some time anyway. One 
candid remark sheds some light on what happened: "Nothing was actually held up but we used it 
(ARDP) as an excuse on some occasions". 
3.9. Ministries not directly involved in ARDP can very understandably be expectecl to complain 
that ARDP held up their work. A much more careful ancl detailed evaluation would be necessary 
for definitive statements to be made about particular cases. The one programme often citecl as 
having been delayed is secondary schools. T h e ARDP ancl consequent work in the MOYV may 
indeed have been responsible for a delay of some months. But a prior clelay was the preparation of 
design specifications by the Ministry of Education which appears to be a recurring bottleneck 
(e.g. with the Technical Wing for the Selebi-Pikwe Secondary School for which DANIDA funds 
are saicl to have been available since March 1975). In the event, two of the secondary schools — 
Moleli School in Mochudi and Seepapitso School in Kanye — were probably built more cheaply 
ancl possibly oven morequickly as a result of the ARDP: contracts werenegotiated with Minestone 
who were already on site for ARDP work and who coidd show a substantial saving through not 
including mobilisation costs in their tender. Molefi School was completed in May 1976 ancl 
Seepapitso School in ]uly 1976. 
3.10. T h e eviclence reviewed points towards the conclusión that the ARDP clid little damage to 
other programmes. What it did was provide a heaven-sent scapegoat to which delays ancl 
deficiencies coidcl be attributed. It also proviclecl an examj>le of rapicl implementation which 
shook complacency ancl showed up those ministries, departments ancl even individuáis 
responsible for lagging performance. One of the most important long-term effects of the ARDP 
was to show that there were other gears into which other ministries, departments ancl individuáis 
could (ancl should) change. 
Management: Financial ancl Physical Monitoring and Control 
3.11. The ARDP placed an immense strain ancl responsibility on District Councils. T h e increase 
in Councils' expenditures is shown in table 3.4. 
Table. 3.4. lacreases in District Councils' fíudgets 1972 — 1975/6 
in Pula '000 
Actual Estimatecl 
1972 1973-4 1974 1975-6 
Capital Budget 206 1,018 1,312 3,104 
Recurrent budget 3,265 3,800 5,400 7,200 
Total 3,471 4,818 6,712 11,304 
Percentage increase 
over previous year N.A. 39 39 68 
Percentage increase 
capital budget over 
previous year 
of 
N.A. 394 29 137 
Note: T h e recurren 1 budget incl ludes teachers' salaries 
The capital budget increased 15-lold over l'our years from 1972 to 1975-6. Most of this increase can 
be attributed to the ARDP, as can some of the increases in recurrent expenditure. In the words of 
one Central Government official "We held our fingers at the amount of money we were pouring 
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out into a system incapable of hanclling it"; and in the words one another official at the receiving 
end "the Districts were suffering from shock for several months". 
3.12. Councils' accounting systems could not handle either the volume or the nature of the work. 
They were not organisecl to separate deveiopment expenditure from recurrent. Recurrent funds 
were therefore used for what was strictly capital expenditure. From an accounting point of view it 
was lar easier to pay for drivers and petrol, to take two examples, using the existing recurrent votes 
than to charge them to a capital vote. The strain was gravely exacerbated by the system oí labour-
only contracts for building which at that time were commonly (ancl necessarily) used by Councils. 
Whereas a contract in which the contractor himself pin chases and supplies all the materials may 
involve writing only 4 or 5 cheques over the lile of the project, a labour-only contract has been saicl 
to involve as may as 400 or 500 cheques for the same work. This figure may be exaggerated, but 
there is certainly a huge difference in the volume of accounting involved. Inunclated as they were, 
Council accounting staff l'ound it especially clifficult to change their system. 
3.13. T h e results might have been much worse. These were conditions presenting ampie 
opportunities for corruption, especially as the audit service was not geared up for the amount of 
work required of it. There were, it is true, cases of múltiple misdemeanours and misappropriations. 
The worst case was probably the North West District Council of which the auditor wrote for 1974/5 
"There was no control of expenditure ancl every main heacl was overspent", ancl where he founcl 
that some councillors had claimed up to 14 days subsistence for one committee meeting. All the 
same there does not appear lo have been the widespread corruption that might have been 
expected in some other countries. And in the longer term, Councils were forced and arestill being 
forced to streamline ancl aclapt their accounting ancl to recruit ancl train their staff so as to be able 
to handle a much greater volume of work. 
3.14. One innovation of the ARDP wás a reporting ancl monitoring system designed to improve 
financial and physical monitoring and control. Reports were at first quarterly ancl later three 
times a year. On the financial side the reports hacl six heads. 
(a) Funds received from Ministry 
(b) Funds committed against orders placed 
(c) Funds spent on materials/services received 
(el) Total (b) + (c) committed ancl spent 
(e) Difference (a) — (el) funds received but not committed or spent 
(/) retention money funds (i i any) withheld from builcler pending final Council approval of 
completed project. 
3.15. At first some, perhaps most, Councils were unable lo supply these cletails accurately. One 
Council officer saicl that "The financial statements given during the ARDP were guesses". 
Accounts were not kept in ways which enabled the required inlormation easily to be extracted. 
The reporting had the effect of forcing Councils to change their ledger systems so that a check 
could be kept on connuitments and cost overruns could be loreseen. In one large Council, these 
thrice-yearly reports have three times enabled staff lo foresee over-expenditures ancl to take 
appropriate act ion in time. This appears, then lo be a case where a judicious deniand for 
inlormation eventually helped lo provoke a reform of accounting procedures ancl financial 
control. 
3.16. On the physical reporting side of the same monitoring system, the stage of implementation 
of projects is indicated in a simple three category code: 
A = materials ordered 
B = construction started 
C = construction completed. 
(This has subsequently been refined or complicated, accorcling to one's point of view, in Central 
District into a seven category code with A as contract signed, B through F as percentage 
completions in 20 percent brackets, and G as bandee! over to Council). This simple reporting 
again hacl an effect on monitoring and reporting within Councils, which had to devise their own 
methods for obtaining the inlormation required. 
3.17. A delibérate attempt was made at the Gaborone end to keep the reporting requirements 
simple. Like any other reporting system, tliis one has costs in terms of staff time. Surprisingly, no 
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person interviewecl had serious criticisms of the system. T o the contrary, there was universal 
agreement that it had been and continued to be beneficial and that it was not uncluly onerous to 
compile now that Councils had organised themselves to be able to provide the information 
neeclecl. 
3.18. Taking the system as a whole, some of the main benefits appear to be: 
— early warning of cost overruns 
— increased cost ancl vote consciousness 
— improved knowledge of progress ancl identification of bottlenecks in implementation. 
— up-to-date and accurate information for donors 
— greater ease of evaluation. 
It is difficult to asses to what extent the system has speeded ancl improved implementation but its 
contribution may well have been substantial. Any system of this sort is Hable to encourage and 
induce organised work methods and regular checks. T h e use of bar charts for programming is one 
related practice, although their use for monitoring appears still to be rare. It may not be entirely a 
coincidence that implementation tends to lag in ministries which were not affected by this 
approach. Such ministries might benefit from similar management procedures. 
Enhanced Implementing Capacity 
3.19. T h e ARDP gave a lot of useful experience to a wide range of people and institutions as a 
result of which implementing capacity, that crucial resource, was augmented. Big contractors 
learnt how to work in villages. Small and médium contractors grew in competence, confidence ancl 
capital, and now constitute a continuing ancl growing capability for rural works. Many semi-
skilled labourers must have learnt on the job, increasing this national resource. At the key level of 
site foreman, however, it was only with the rather unsuccessful Council Works Units that there was 
much attempt to develop local capability and in late 1976 the Kgalagadi District sent two of its ex-
ARDP foremen on a course. In other fields such as water development and school furniture there 
was an increase in skills and in the ability to get things done in and for villages. 
3.20. T h e most important development was the enhanced capability and credibility of District 
Councils. They surprised most observers, including rural people and some of their own staff, with 
what they showed could do. When ARDP broke it was said that Councils lacked direction and were 
doing little. After a huge convulsión they settled down at a much higher level of performance. 
Taking merely the construction programmes, the figures in table 3.5 are revealing. 
Table 3.5.: Councils' Construction Programmes: Estimates and Targets 
1973-78 Plan 
Primary School Facilities Target for New Construction 1975/6 1976/7 
Classrooms 7004 300 296 
Teachers' Ouarters n.a. 191 148 
Toilets n.a. 164 171 
Estimated cost 1,960,000" 2,505,000a 
Health Facilities3 
Clinics 624 13 5 
Health Posts 156 22 41 
Nurses' Ouarters n.a. 7 13 
Estimated cost 553,000 792,300 
Notes: 1 Including o . . . P330,000 ARDP overrun from the ] jrevious year. 
2 Including P98,000 overrun, mainly ARDP, from the previous year. 
This is not a complete listing. Some maternity facililies are omitted. 
4 Urban and rural. The figures in this table are rural only. 
By the end of the ARDP Council construction programmes hacl reached a new platean, higher 
than anticipated in the 1973-78 Plan. 
3.21. One aspect of the increased capability of District Councils was the personal development ol 
Council staff who discovered more of what they were able to cío. Most ol the experience gained by 
Volunteers is losl to Botswana as they lcave (though some stay on) bul it may prove an asset 
elsewhere. T h e experience gained by Batswana should he a lasting asset to the country. 
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3.22. Finally, the ARDP showed Gaborone that District Councils were alive, articúlate and active. 
One professional officer in central Government saicl "VVe are aware now that there is local 
government". The ARDP helped to lay the foundation oí that central faith in local capability 
which is fundamental to any programme of devolution. 
T H E RURAL IMPACT 
3.23. A comprehensive review of the rural impact of ARDP would be a massive task. All that will 
be attempted here is a selective examination of certain key aspects. 
(i) Employment ancl Income Effects 
3.24. T h e employment and income effects of the ARDP were not limilecl to Botswana or to rural 
areas. Employment and incomes were generated in Rhodesia ancl South Africa through orders for 
materials and ec|uipment placed there ancl a lew non-Batswana (including this evaluator) 
benefitted from temporary employment, mainly as building construction and road supervisors. 
Employment and incomes were also generated in urban areas, notably Gaborone, where Modular 
Construction sel up a small factory ancl where Minestone hacl its headquarters. But most of the 
employment and income effects were rural, taking rural to inclucle the larger villages. 
3.25. Some informal estimates of the numbers of semi-skilled ancl unskilled persons employed at 
the peak periocls by some of the 5 employers can be listecl by way of examples: 
Minestone (for 15 months) 100-450 
Construction in the Kgalagadi 125-150 
Fowler (at Molepolole, over 100 
for 4-5 months) 
Southern District 
Council Works Teams about 110 
Kgatleng District 
Council Works Teams 70-80 
Small contractors, 
Kgatleng District 15-30 
It may be noted that the prefabricated construction adopted for some of the larger villages was 
probably less labour-intensive than traclitional construction and probably m|iiircd less labour at 
the local level. 
3.26. These scattered estimates give only the crudest idea of orders of magnitude, ancl do not 
include the water programme, the rural roads programme, the production of school furniture, or 
brickmaking. During 1974-5, the average monthly semi-skilled ancl unskilled employment 
generated by the ARDP might (on an uneclucated guess) have been of the orcler of 2,000 to 3,000. 
3.27. Some permanent employment was stimulated by the ARDP. A small example is the 
Kweneng Rural Deveiopment Association which doubled its brickmaking capacity, employing an 
additional 16 people, ancl which has managecl to maintain that level of employment since, 
benefitting from the cjuiet construction boom in Molej)olole. In the public sector, most oí those 
employed in Councils' Works teams were laid off although sometimes attempts are made to get 
them back on Councils' recurrent budgets. Some permanent employment was created in the 
maintenance and servicing sectors of councils, for example for Family Welfare Educators. Most of 
the long-term employment generated, however, has probably been in the small entrepreneurial 
sector. Before ARDP, Councils were partly unawareof the small contractors in their areas. During 
ARDP some carne to light, others started up, ancl Councils ancl contractors gained experience. 
Many fell by the wayside but a substantial number establishcd themselves and are now doing work 
both for Councils and in the private sector. T h e amount of new building going on in large villages 
is noteworthy ancl must be providing employment which partly compensates for the slack in 
urban sector construction. Without the ARDP some of this capability would not have been 
developecl ancl consequently some of this current construction might not be taking place. 
Moreover, as we have seen Councils' construction programmes have stabilised at a high plateau 
which they might not have reached, ancl certainly would not have reachecl anything like as 
quickly, without the ARDP. 
3.28. No evidence has come to light that ARDP affected wages. T h e minimum wages rise of mid-
1974 affected those working for large contractors. It is not known whether, following the rise, any 
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labour was laid off. There should have been no need since in the terms of their contracts, these 
contractors coulcl claim back from the government all the additional expenditure entailed. 
Councils similarly followecl the new rates, except in some of the more remote villages. Small 
contractors, however, were generally not directly affected, and daily wages of as low as 70-80 thebe 
have been reported. It is a bizarre fact that the poorer people are, the less they tend to be paid. As 
usual, it was at the rural periphery that benefits, in this case in wages, were lowest. In consecjuence, 
those of the poorest people who live in the remoter areas ancl who were employed by contractors 
gained much less than those who managed to be employed in the larger villages. Moreover, wage 
payments by some of the smaller contractors were erratic. 
'i.29. In gross terms, in 1974/5, an extremely rough estímate of the wages paicl lo Batswana as a 
direct result of ARDP expenditure, can be calculated as follows: 
Average daily wage (including overtime) 2P per day 
Number employed ' 2,000-3,000 
Number of days for which paicl 300 
Gross payment P1.2 to 1.8 million. 
This compares with an ARDP expenditure in 1974/5 of PfO million. Most of this expenditure was 
in the rural arcas ancl much of it to unskilled labour, which can be'presumed to include some of the 
poorer rural people. 
(ii) Distribution bv District 
3.30. Anv breakdown of ARDP expenditures or achievements by geographical area is Hable to 
mislead un less it ¡s carried out in cletail and with supporting information, including previous 
levéis of development ancl services, relativo capital costs of providing services, levels of living of 
populations by areas, relativo accessibility of services, ancl populations served. Such meticulous 
work may better be concentrated on planning liiture services rather than on evaluating past 
actions. Some statements can, however, be made about the clistribution by district of some ARDP 
expenditures ancl achievement. 
3.31. A district-wise breakdown of expenditures for most of the ARDP programmes is given in 
appendix D. For reasons explained in the notes to the appendix, the figures can only be 
provisional. Taking these expenditures, which amount lo some P16 million out ol the P21 million 
lor the ARDP as a whole, the breakdown by district and the relationships between expenditure 
ancl rural population are shown in table 3.(i. 
Table-Vi. Rural Population ancl Selectecl AKDP Expenditure2 bv District 
ARlJl' Percentage Percentage % of Per Capita 
DISTRICT Population Expenditure2 of ARDP of Rural Expenditure^ Expenditure 
(1976p Expenditure Population % of (rounded) 
Population Pula 
Central3 260,400 5,137,479 31,8 12 0.8 20 
South-East 24,300 1,012,327 6,3 1 1.6 42 
Southern 96,400 2,675,694 16,6 li) l.i 28 
North-East 30,600 504,197 3,1 5 0,6 16 
Ghanzi 14,700 706,776 4,4 9 1,9 48 
Kgalagadi 18,100 1,082,313 6,7 3 2,3 60 
Kgatleng 37,600 1,269,051 7,9 6,0 1,3 34 
Kweneng 75,800 2,026,085 12,6 12 1,0 27 
28 
Ngamiland 57,300 
1,721,469 10,7 10 1,2 27 
Chobe 7,400 
T O T A L 622,600 16,135,391 100,00 100 26 
Notes: 1 NDP 1976-81, Draft, Part I, p 1.8 
2 exeluding integrated office blocks, dams, livestock saleyards, Local Authority 
Deveiopment Grants, Tribal Administration/Customary Courts, Primary School 
Equipment, Rural Industrial Infrastructure, and Rural Power Supplies. See 
Appendix D for sources. 
3 exeluding Selebi-Pikwe and Orapa 
3.32. A breakdown of achievements by District as reported complete at 31 March 1976 is given in 
table 1.5. 
3.33. To ¡Ilústrate the distribution of one particular item, school classrooms, table 3.7 shows the 
number of new classrooms constructed under the ARDP per thousand rural population. 
Table 3.7. New Classrooms Per Head of Rural Population by District 
Number of new Rural Population Number of New 
District classrooms (1976) classrooms per 
thousand people 
Central 197 260,400 0,76 
South East 14 24,300 0,58 
Southern 67 96,400 0,70 
North East 31 30,600 1,01 
Ghanzi 14 14,700 0,95 
Kgalagadi 38 18,100 2,10 
Kgatleng 27 37,600 0,72 
Kweneng 81 75,800 1,07 
North West 20 64,700 0,31 
Note: The self-help contribution to these classrooms was substantial only in the North East 
District where it is reflected in the low cost per classroom of P2,400 (rounded). 
3.34. Care has to be taken in interpreting these figures. In particular: 
(i) recorded costs per unit of construction were generally higher in the large villages ancl in 
the remote districts (Northwest, Ghanzi, and Kgalagadi) than elsewhere. This means that 
per caput expenditure figures for the remote districts give an exaggerated impression of 
per caput benefits. 
(ii) the cost figures do not cover all the ARDP projects and are not final figures, 
(iii) the primary school classroom figures can be misleading because districts varied consider-
ably in the extent to which they opted to build teachers' quarters instead of classrooms and 
the extent to which other buildings, such as clinics and health posts were put up. 
3.35. The reader may wish to examine the tables and make his or her own analysis. In the 
meantime, the following observations appear justified: 
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1. Per head of population the remote districts of Ghanzi and Kgalagadi benefited dis-
proportionately, as intended. Per caput expenditures were 48 ancl 60 Pula respectively, 
comparecí with a mean of 26 Pula (All Districts). Kgalagadi District had by far ihe highest 
proportion of new classrooms built per thousand population (2.1 comparecí with the next 
highest 1.1 in Kweneng). 
2. Considering its remoteness North West District clicl not do so well. This may partly rellect 
administrative difficulties experiencecl by the 'North West District Council. Per caput 
expenditures were only about average, at P27, although construction costs were high. 
However, the construction of 5 clinics all in small villages ancl 6 nurses houses should mean a 
substantial benefit to a population exposed to a more disease-ridden environment that the 
rest of Botswana. 
3. T h e lowest per caput expenditures were in the North East District, with only 16 Pula per 
caput. This figure is low partly because North East clid not have a district headcjuarters ancl 
therefore did not have any major roads through villages or District Council or District 
Administration housing. 
4. The per caput expenditures for Central District at first sight appear surprisingly low, at P20. 
This may, however, reflect two factors: some economies of scale leading to lower unit costs; 
ancl difficulties with implementation resulting from the size of the district. 
5. Per caput expenditures for the South East District, at P42 are high. In contrast with the North 
East District, it has, however, a district headquarters. About one third of the expenditures 
was for the tarred road in Ramotswa. Even so, the South East appears to have done quite well 
out of the ARDP. 
3.36. A general conclusión is that, given that funds were not seriously constraining, expenditures 
ancl achievements depended largely on administrative capacity and ease of implementation. Per 
caput expenditures tended to be high where implementation was relatively easy (South East, 
Kgatleng) ancl where special measures were taken to augment implementing capacity (Kgalagadi), 
ancl low where implementation was difficult for reasons of scale (Central) or administrative 
capacity was a problem (North West). 
(iii) The ARDP and Self-help 
3.37. Three questions can be askecl about ARDP ancl self-help. These concern first, the effects of 
self-help on ARDP; second the effects of ARDP on self-help; ancl third, what conclusions can be 
derived from the experience. 
3.38. First, in most areas villagers made some contribution to ARDP construction in the small 
villages. T h e most common form was bricks made under the Foocl for Work programme which 
provided food to people who made bricks. T h e greatest self-help contribution was probably in the 
Northeast District. Elsewhere it was very variable. T h e usual intention was that village 
communities would provide free the sand and stone needed by labour-only contractors in small 
villages. In practice the Council usually had to intervene with its transport and labour ancl to do 
much or all of the work directly itself. 
A study conducted in Central District concluded that self-help in that District contributed less 
than 2 per cent of the valué of the ARDP programme (Riordan 1975:26). T h e uncertainties and 
delays of relying partially on self-help probably cost more than it savecl. 
3.39. Seconcl, the effect of ARDP on self-help is much more imponderable. Opinions differ. Some 
consider that a dramatic intervention by government to build, say, a school classroom block in a 
village where previous classrooms hacl been constructed, albeit slowly, by the villagers, had a 
damaging effect on future prospects for self-help. Others consider the ARDP to have been only a 
minor influence. In this view, there is a long-term trend away from voluntary labour 
contributions and towards cash contributions; ancl perhaps a further trend away from self-help for 
communal facilities altogether. It is widely believed that the P'oocl For Work programme hacl a 
much more clamaging effect than clicl ARDP on willingness to work on self-help without reward. 
This receives some support from a recent evaluation of the Food For Work programme in 
Botswana. ("The uses of Food Aicl in Botswana", 23 ff. ancl 39-40). It is perhaps to be expected that 
as employment opportunities multiply ancl the cash economy becomes more pervasive, voluntary 
labour on communal village projects will decline. T o some extent, the ARDP may have 
accelerated this process, but self-help in various forms continúes in many villages includingsome 
such as Gabane ancl Thamaga where there was an ARDP input. 
30 
3.40. Third, one possible conclusión is that these trends do not matter very much. Self-help is 
quite often regressive. Women usually do most of the work. Financial contributions tend to beon a 
l'lat rate which discriminates against the poor and in favour of the relatively rich. Moreover, in 
practical terms self-help can be a very expensive means of construction. An analysis of self-help 
brick-making in Central District (Riorclan 1975) has shown that becauseof high waste, failure rates 
ancl delays involved, self-help brick-making may be more expensive than other methods. It can 
also be both expensive ancl demoralising for communities when something they have built (for 
example Brightmore School) collapses ancl the Council has lo come in and replace it. Self-help is 
likely to continué ancl even expand in what closely touches people: perhaps in customary and 
religious matters like constructing or repairing the kgotla or a church: and in economic matters 
like fencing off lands from grazing areas. Since Councils now have an enhanced capability to 
construct educational ancl health facilties through local contractors ancl since they have the funds 
necessary, the case is weakenecl lor burdening local communities with all these tasks as well. 
3.41. What seems needed is a sensitive review of VDCs, Community Development ancl self-help 
in order to see the best way forward. As a first step a clear distinction might be sought between 
types of activity which Councils or Government should undertake, ancl types of activity which 
should lie within the domain of communities. There are dangers of ideological paternalism 
among those who do not themselves have to take part in self-help bul who advócate it for others. 
All the same, there are valúes in it for community solidarity and mobilisation. It is possible to 
suggest types of construction, such as shelters for health posts and perhaps staff housing, which 
might be the responsibility of communities; but it might also be right at this stage to review the 
nature of development ancl to see whether there are not other realms, especially institutional, 
educational and economic, to which VDCs ancl village communities might not better become 
committed. 
(iv) Reaching tlie periphery and the poor 
3.42. Urban ancl large village bias is notorious. Urban centres ancl large villages, by comparision with 
small villages, are easier to develop, more attractive to professionals to work in, more visible and 
more important politically, wealthier, better provided with services, better staffed ancl better 
servecl by communications, ancl have better recreational facilities, better employment opportunities 
and higher wages. T h e contrast is even more markecl as one moves progressively into scattered 
lands areas, cattle posts and remote boreholes. T h e Rural Incorae Distribution Survey 
1974/75 found household incomes in small villages, lands areas and cattle posts averaging only 
about two fifths of those in large villages (RIDS: 121). Many of the poorest people who are the 
target of the national policy of social justice live precisely in this periphery. 
3.43. The extent lo which the ARDP reachecl ancl benefited such people is difficult to evalúate. A 
comparison of the physical achievements of the large ancl small village programmes is not 
particularly helpful since the larger — smaller distinction was rather arbitrary. T h e "larger" 
villages included 1971 populations of only 472 (Good Ilope), 459 (Mabutsane), 604 (Tshane), and 
720 (Lentsweletau), while the "smaller" villages included with 1971 populations of 3,132 
(Shoshong), 1,767 (Shakawe) 1,783 (Maitengwe) and 1,386 (Letlhakane). All the same, the larger 
village programme both lorced and enabled District Councils to work in smaller ancl less 
accessible villages: lorced them through the instruction that they should cease all building 
activities in the larger villages, which were left to the big contractors; and enabled them because 
they were assurcd that the needs of the larger villages were being met ancl because vital resources 
(especially transpon) were provided for Councils. T h e outeome was an extensión of construction 
work outwards from the centre. T h e spread of health posts, in particular, was steady and 
extensive. Moreover, a threshold was passed and Councils now have the capacity ancl opportunity 
(being taken up by the Central District Council) to phase construction in remote areas by 
grouping small villages and letting contraéis for several buildings in several villages as a package. 
As a resull of ARDP, physical facilities have been pushed ancl are being pushed out faster and 
further into the poor periphery than would otherwise have occurred. 
3.44. But there remain people in that periphery who are still beyond the reach of these physical 
facilities. These include many of the Basarwa. There are also others, like the 6,000 people said to 
live to the northeast of the Okavango, who remain largely out of contad ancl largely unserved, in 
that case in an area where malaria is endemic. Peripheral people like these were not touched by 
the ARDP though they may be touchecl by its sequel. 
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3.45. In the meantime the ARDP appears to have contributed to a groundswell of demands for 
services. Peripheral people use self-help both to help themselves ancl as a means of drawing 
attention to themselves. T h e people of Tsetseng on the Ghanzi — Kgalagadi border raised money 
for classrooms through gumba-gumba parties (Botswana Daily News 10 November, 1976). T h e 
people of Manxotae some 33 km from Nata River contributed towards a school and health post. 
The people of Madibela in the Rakops area decicled they wanted a health post and put one up, 
after which the Council built them a better one. T h e people of Ramotlabaki in Kgatleng built a 
school in an area which the Council clicl not recognise as a village, but once they had clone that the 
Council built them teachers' quarters. These events might have happened anyway. T h e important 
point is that peripheral people are clemanding more and Councils have a greater capacity and 
willingness to provide it, at least in terms of structures. 
3.46. Unfortunately structures by themselves do not ensure effective services. A recent study of 
education by the IDM (Campbell and Abbott 1976) has shown a strong bias in the distribution of 
trainecl teachers and of A ancl B grades, as presented in table 3.8. 
Table 3.8 Educational Indicators by Level of Urban-Rural Hierarchy 
Per cení age of 
A&B Grades A Grade 
Level of trained Untrained as percentages as percentages 
hierarchy teachers teachers of those who of those who 
sat the St. 7 sat the St. 7 
exam. 1975 exam. 1975 
Towns 98 2 42 16 
District Headquarters 73 27 32 9 
Large villages 51.5 48.5 26 8 
Small villages 50 50 26 7 
Source: Campbell and Abbott 1976: tables 2 ancl 6 
These figures show clear enough trends but they conceal small villages where the position is even 
worse. At Mogorosi there are 6 untrained teachers to only 3 trainecl and not one of the 19 pupils 
who sat the Standard 7 examination last year obtained either an A or a B. This may be an extreme 
case but the general tendency is clear: children who go to primary school in small villages have a 
much worse chance of obtaining good grades than those who go in District Headquarters and even 
more so in urban centres. 
3.47. T h e construction of primary school facilities in small villages as undertaken during and 
after the ARDP has brought obvious benefits: fewer classes have to be held outside (where quite 
apart from rain, wind, dust ancl sun there may be no black-boards or desks) and fewer classes have 
to be held on a double-shift basis; hygiene is better with more toilets; ancl school furniture if 
appropriate presumably improves learning. What is more debatable, but also important, is 
whether better teachers' quarters, as built by Councils under the ARDP, make more distant rural 
lile less unattractive for teachers, and especially trainecl teachers, making it easier to post them to 
such places, less likely that if so postee! they will resign, ancl more likely that, once in post, they will 
give good service. 
3.48. The scattered evidence and opinion collected combines to suggest that housing is, though a 
factor, not a crucial one. Although their location in District Headquarters was lar from 
peripheral, it is perhaps relevant that out of 91 recent responses from District Council staff to the 
question "What problems are you encountering or have you encountered which made it 
unattractive to work in the setting that you are presently working in?" only 9 mentioned housing 
compared with 14 mentioning inadequate office facilities. More d irectly, it is strikmg that about 
half of the 190-odd teachers' quarters built under the ARDP in Central District are standing 
empty, the teachers preferring to live in villages and to avoid paying the rent, which is saicl to be 
6 Pula for a rondavel without toilet or kitchen, and 7.50 Pula for arondavel with toilet ancl kitchen. 
Insofar as housing can encourage teachers to serve in rural areas, it will only do so if they want to 
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occupy it. There is a case for reviewing the policy on rents in both smaller ancl larger villages. 
But other factors like non-payment of salary (at Shakawe one teacher was saicl not to have been 
paid for eight months), irregular mail (on November 17th 1976 Gomare had hacl no mail since 
November 1, ancl that had been brought by a social anthropologist whose services must be 
considered temporary), lack of facilities for recreation, and problems over the supply of water 
when taken together are probably much more powerful disincentives than poor housing. In 
conclusión, then, the teacher's housing constructed during ancl since the ARDP appears to have 
hacl a disappointing impact and to have brought fewer benefits than might have been hoped. 
3.49. In the health field there are similar problems of attracting staff into the remoter areas. Some 
of the nurses in distant clinics are expatriates, presumably as astopgap until morenurses come out 
of training. T h e increased demand for staff created by the ARDP stimulated the extensión of 
enrolled nurse training schools. In contrast with the shortage of nurses, the training of Family 
Welfare Educators to staff health posts has presented no problems and 250 have already taken the 
3-month course. 
3.50. The construction of facilities remains a necessary but not sufficient condition for the 
achievement of the social justiceobjectiveof the Fourth National Development Plan 1976-81. This 
states that: 
"Development should benefit all sections of the population and all areas of the country. 
Specific implications that are relevant to rural development are: 
— All Batswana, wherever they live and whatever their social background, should have equal 
access to services that the Government provides — such as education, health, and water 
supplies. 
— Services available to different groups and in different areas should be comparable in quality 
as well as mere availability" (NDP4, 4.2) 
3.51. T o achieve these objectives three further conditions are necessary. In the first place, 
adequate staff have to be trained and posted. This is not the place to enter into these questions in 
detail except to note that a radically new approach may be needed, including perhaps a period of 
national service early in each person's career when he or she is required to serve in one of the 
remotest areas, special incentive payments for those who serve in such areas after their national 
service, and special measures for communication which might include two-way radios. 
3.52. Second, the staff concerned must act with dedication ancl impartially especially with 
Basarwa and with distant groups of people, precisely those who are poorest, least accessible, ancl 
least able effectively to demand or request services. A case is reported where staff on an anti-
malaria campaign spray ecl all the huts except those of the Basarwa and where the Basarwa decided 
not to protest. Elsewhere the difference between declicatecl ancl indifferent staff may be reflectecl in 
whether or not difficult ancl uncomfortable journeys are undertaken in the course of duty. It is 
easy tospecify but hard to achieve the spirit of professional commitment to service that is needed. 
3.53. Third, "equal access" to services requires a positive bias in the provisión of services to offset 
the disadvantages of those who are remote and of those who are poor. Taken to its logical 
conclusión, equal access is geographically impossible: a person living in Kule is further from a 
hospital than a person living along the line of rail. Rural people usually have much further to go 
for services than people in large villages or urban areas. On top of this they are generally poorer. 
Equal access also implies an equal capacity to pay the fees required for a service. Charges are at 
present levied for education, for health services, ancl for water. T h e fee for primary education has 
been reduced from 6 Pula to 3 Pula per annum but there are additional charges (for uniform, 
sports fees, cook's wages, etc.) which amount to some 4 Pula per annum (RIDS:219) which more than 
double the cost to aparent. Health services are free for children up to age of 12, but for those who are 
over 12 a fee of 40 thebe is chargecl for a course of treatment (RIDS:218). Charges, reportedly of 2 
Pula, are tó be levied for village water supplies. Charges for all these services in the rural areas are 
regressive: they hurt the poorer more than the less poor. They conflict with the objective of equal 
access ancl with the national ideal of social justice. 
3.54. Two justifications are usually advanced for levying fees of this sort. 
(i) a neecl to provide government revenue to pay for the service. This has no forcé in 
Botswana, where the problem is precisely the opposite: how to divert revenue into the r u r a l 
areas, not how to extract it from them. 
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(ii) a need to make people use a service sparingly. This applies to education only insofar as 
there is a shortage of primary school teachers, classrooms and equipment and consequently 
a need to prevent children from going to school. It applies to health only insofar as there 
may be malingerers, a situation more likely in urban areas than in rural areas where people 
have substantial distances to walk to clinics ancl health posts. It applies to water only if 
water is paid for by volume used, which is administratively expensive and does not appear 
to be proposed in rural Botswana. 
The issues with education are complicated ancl it would be irresponsible to suggest otherwise. 
Sudden abolition of all fees might provoke an unmanageable influx into primary schools. It is a 
question of direction. If the aim is equal access, then the path towards it involves the abolition of 
fees and other charges, meaning that uniforms, books ancl equipment should also be provided free 
of charge. This might quite dramatically improve the access of poor rural children to education. 
One immediate measure could be in the short-tenn actively to discourage the use of uniforms in 
rural schools. Given the irrelevance or weakness of these two points, the case is strong for making 
access to education, health services and water less unequal by abolishing charges for them in the 
rural areas. Administration would be reduced, access would be more equal; the poor ancl the very 
poor would benefit; and social justice would be served. 
T H E COSTS AND BENEFITS OF SPEED AND P R I O R I T Y 
3.55. T h e ARDP was accorded high priority ancl carried out under pressure, especially during its 
first ten months. Since such an approach might again be considered, it is useful to assess its costs 
ancl benefits in the ARDP case, so that in future costs could be reduced and benefits increased.. 
3.56. T h e main extra costs attributable to the priority and speed of the ARDP were: 
(i) raised financial costs to the Botswana Government 
These were especially marked with the major roads through villages ancl with the larger 
villages construction programme carried out by big contractors. T h e main factors were: 
— contractors in a strong bargaining position ancl civil servants in a weak position because 
of the deaclline. 
— the adoption of the schedule of rates instead of the usual bilí of quantities for road 
construction. 
— some overheating of the construction sector (but this has been exaggerated). 
— supervisión of roads contractors by consultants. (This may occur anyway and may be 
justified, but it does put up the costs). 
— lost opportunities to obtain donor funds, mainly for school construction, for which 
domestic revenue was used instead. 
— costs of modifications to designs, such as the removal of plumbing from some houses, 
changes in culvert size etc. wbich might have been avoided with more time and care. 
— some of the compensation paid for houses demolished to make way for roads was higher 
than it would have been. 
(ii) bad outcomes. These can be attributed to: 
(a) lack of consultation. This applied particularly to the major roads through villages and to 
the staff housing in larger villages. 
(b) inappropriate designs. These occurred especially with the major roads, with pre-
fabricated staff housing, ancl with school furniture. 
(c) problems of supervisión. This applied particularly with the programme for major roads 
through villages. 
(iii) programme bias towards what could be done quickly 
Any programme with a cióse deadlineis bound to concéntrate on what can be done quickly. 
With the ARDP this reinforced the attention to physical works lo the relative neglect of 
other aspects of rural deveiopment — the encouragement of groups ancl of self-reliance, 
the management of resources, adult education, etc — which may be damaged if rushed. 
T h e implication is that a series of strictly time-bounded programmes would tend to 
exelude these important aspects of rural deveiopment simply because they cannot easily he 
subject to deadlines. 
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3.57. T h e main benefits of the priority and speed of the ARDP were: 
(i) benefits from accelerated construction. Facilities were reacly for use often years earlier 
than they would have been. 
(ii) the implementation capacity of government was fully used ancl was enhanced. Many 
people worked harder than they would have and dropped or deferred work of low 
priority. More was clone more cjuickly than many thought possible. A permanent change 
took place in the capacity of Councils to implement. 
(iii) the priority of rural development was better appreciated in government, especially 
by urban-biased technical officers. 
(vi) the "unbalanced growth" of the ARDP created problems, such as those of staffing clinics, 
which forced other developmental changes. For example, the training of health staff was 
expanded as a result of the additional demand which the ARDP provoked. The ARDP was 
a notable example of that part of development which consists of a chain of bottlenecks — 
attacking the construction bottleneck created others which were thenj:ackled in turn. 
(v) innovations were made. Forced to work hard ancl fast, staff cut corners. New methods were 
introduced. T h e monitoring ancl control system is a notable example. 
(vi) government and councils gained in confidence ancl credibility 
3.58. One main lesson is that strong political leadership and a sense of urgency can forcé and 
enable the civil service to do more, more quickly, and better, than wise and prudent men might 
advise to be possible. 
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4. Lessons for the Future 
AN OVERVIEW. 
4.1. T h e selective evaluation given above is mixed, but generally favourable. It is more 
favourable than the writer expected. There is a danger that this results partly from a failure 
adequately to gauge what would have happened anyway had there been no ARDP. Classrooms 
would have been built, but fewer. Tarred roads would have been built in large villages, but later. 
Staff would have workecl, but less hard. The list could be lengthened. Ancl some things would 
probably not have happened at all — the monitoring system, for example. But these things now 
have happened and are in most cases continuing to happen quite satisfactorily. There is no neecl to 
repeat the ARDP in the same form. It has done its particular job. Some components of the basic 
strategy of trying to deploy and distribute the benefits of revenue from mining to the rural areas 
are now a little easier to implement than before. Councils using local contractors have a greater 
capacity to build even in remote rural areas than they had. Moreover, Central Government staff 
are now more aware of the priority of rural deveiopment. 
4.2. But, as we are often reminded, deveiopment is not bricks ancl mortar. It is one thing, and an 
important thing, to get schools, health posts ancl roacls built ancl water supplies installecl. It is quite 
another, and more difficult, to ensure that they operate, are well staffed, ancl are accessible to all. It 
is yet harder to achieve the national aim of an equitable distribution of incomes, when so many of 
the poorest people are precisely those who are furthest away, least well educated, worst informed, 
least in contact with government, ancl least able to help themselves. The ARDP was a step towards 
them but only on one front. 
4.3. T h e ARDP belonged to that important but easier part of the rural deveiopment process 
which consists of a pushing outwards from the centre towards the periphery. T h e other part, 
which consists of changes in people, families ancl communities, their attitucles, lives, access to 
resources ancl relationships with their environment, is more clelicate, less tangible ancl more 
elusive. T o deal with that side, and with the intractable problems of rural poverty, is strictly 
speaking beyond the terms of reference of this report. But overcoming those problems is both 
more difficult and more important. It is the end towards which a programme like the ARDP is 
only a partial means. In this respect the T G L P consultation, — and measures to redistribute 
opportunities and incomes as well as services to the poorer rural people — seem to this writer to 
present the main frontier and the main challenge. Botswana has shown in the ARDP a greater 
capacity to act, a greater ability to push physical works ancl services into the rural areas, than many 
would have predicted. This greater capacity was realised through an act of imagination and 
political will. T h e issue now is one of imagination and political will to direct policy ancl the civil 
service towards ensuring that economic growth means better lives not just for those rural people 
who are more able to help themselves but specifically for those who are poorer, weaker, and less 
capableof taking advantageof opportunities; for those in short who tencl to get left behincl ancl left 
out. 
FOR T H E F U T U R E 
4.4. Five main findings from this evaluation, ancl the lessons ancl suggestions for the future that 
flow from them, are as follows: 
4.4.1. Urgency raised costs and led to avoidable errors of design ancl construction 
Urgency raised costs in many ways, including placing contractors in a strong bargaining position, 
the adoption of a schedule of rates system instead of a bilí of quantities, ancl the employment of 
supervising consultants for the roacls in major villages. It also led to errors of design ancl 
construction variously with housing, roads, ancl school furniture. 
For the Future 
(i) crash programmes of road construction or buildings by big contractors shoulcl be avoided 
unless there are compelling reasons which justify the foreseeable extra cost. 
(ii) the need for crash building programmes shoulcl be reduced through a system of 
monitoring the process of project iclentification right through to completion. This should 
36 
be centred on the Building Programme Coordinator in the MOW. Pie should receive 
regular reports from Ministries and within the MOW showing the status of projects and 
should maintain records which will show where delays have occurred or are occuring, 
enabling remedial action to be taken. He should have full authority to request information 
to enable him to do his job. 
(iii) designs, whether for houses, other buildings, roads, furniture or equipment, should be 
discussecl with future users ancl where desirable modified before construction starts. A 
search for cheap and efficent designs should be a matter of routine, ancl innovations (for 
example for rondavel construction as pioneered by the Rural Industrial Innovations 
Centre at Kanye) should be appraised ancl where appropriate adoptecl. 
4.4.2. The ARDP revealed and developed far greater implementation capacity in the distrícts than was 
expected. Councils ancl local contractors clid more than many believed they could. Partly this was 
because the ARDP coincided with an influx of additional staff. Partly it was because Council staff 
as a whole worked harder and with more purpose than they would otherwise have clone. A lasting 
change was made to implementing capacity. Councils gained in confidence and credibility. T h e 
policy of devolving responsibility to the local level paicl goocl clividends. 
For the Future 
(i) any major programme should, as with District Councils in the ARDP, be preceded by a 
build up of staff and institutions to handle it. If any future priority programme is intended, 
planning the procurement ancl training of staff shoulcl precede it by at least 1-2 years. 
(ii) the enhanced local building capacity through the employment of contractors by Councils 
presents an opportunity to relieve government departments of the costly and very time-
consuming business of constructing buildings. On an agency basis, Councils could handle 
the tendering ancl supervisión for, say, the construction of Agricultural Demonstrators' 
Quarters for the Ministry of Agriculture. This would save agricultural (and other 
departmental) staff much time, release their energies for their substantive work, ancl also 
speed up construction for some departments with which it lags. 
(iii) a block grant system to District Councils shoulcl be considered to encourage initiative on 
the part of local-level officials ancl to enable local bottlenecks to be broken quickly. 
(iv) in general, the policy of devolution to Councils and to central government staff at the local 
level, should be pursued. 
4.4.3. Management procedures, improved performance and control 
T h e reporting system introduced within the Ministry of Local Government and Lands was an 
important factor in reforming Councils' accounting systems, in identifying and monitoring 
problems ancl achievements, ancl in improving management ancl financial control. While this 
system demonstrated the potential for improved management, that potential has not generally 
been realised elsewhere within the government. Given that implementing capacity is a more acute 
constraint than finance, a very high priority shoulcl be to try through improved management to 
expand that capacity. 
For the Future 
(i) especially in Ministries where implementation lags, management procedures should be 
a focus for attention ancl innovation. In particular, procedures for target setting, 
programming ancl monitoring (perhaps along the lines of Management by Objectives) 
should be used. If well done, the effect in some ministries could be dramatic. 
(ii) there is much to be saicl for using management expertise which is locally available for the 
collaborative design, testing and introduction of such procedures. What is required is 
something which goes a goocl deal further than conventional Organisation and may 
extend beyond the current scope of the Management Services Unit and methods in the 
Directorate of Personnel. T h e Institute of Development Management is a potentially 
valuable local resource for the sort of sensitive and innovative work which is needed. 
(iii) procedures can be specially designed to improve and monitor the achievement of national 
plan objectives. An example of a procedure for giving a poverty rating to project 
memoranda is given in Appendix E. This proposal is designed to remind those involved 
in project identification ancl design of some of the objectives of the plan and also to enable 
ministries to monitor the extent to which their new projects are directed towards the 
periphery and the poor. 
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4.4.4. Decisive political leadership made officials work harder and achieve more 
The civil service responded loyally and well to the clear objectives set. There was grumbling and 
friction as some were forced out of their ruts, but many officials, especially in the districts, worked 
hard and not only achieved a lot but enjoyed it. Decisive leadership increased the output of 
government and Councils. With such decisive direction and leadership, the civil service might 
again achieve things which some consider impossible. 
For the future 
(i) providing it is not used too often, this sort of leadership at the national level can 
galvanise the civil service for priority programmes. Care will always be needed where 
rural people (as opposed to physical infrastructure) are concerned, since with people the 
costs of undue haste can be high. 
(ii) there is scope for similar decisive political leadership within ministries. Ministers might 
wish to consider, in conjuction with new systems of management, instituting regular 
reviews of performance at which their sénior staff would report on progress against targets 
and on problems encountered, ancl at which work targets would be set for completion by 
the time of the next review. 
4.4.5. The ARDP was not designed to confront, and did not confront, the central issue of the poorer people 
in the rural areas 
T h e ARDP and its aftermath were a step, and a significant step, towards reducing the gradient of 
imbalance in services and access to services between the urban areas, the large villages, the small 
villages, and the remoter areas. But the ARDP was not designed to tackle and did not in any major 
lasting way tackle, the issue, central to thepolicy of social justice elaborated in the Fourth National 
Deveiopment Plan 1976-81, of equitable levels of living for the poorer rural people. 
For the future 
(i) a programme for promoting rural equity should be considered. This programme, set in 
the framework of the Fourth National Deveiopment Plan, would, like the ARDP, provide 
support and Ímpetus to existing and new projects. These projects would be selected and 
designed to focus and accelerate the provisión of access to resources, income opportunities 
and services, to the more disadvantaged people within the rural sector. 
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APPENÜIX B: Comparative Estimates For a Block of Two Classrooms 
Source Details Year 
Total 
cost in 
Pula 
ni2 Cost 
rounded NOTES 
A. Larger villages 
Programme of 
ARDP including 
addition for 
ceiling at 17%%. 
(MOW estímate) 
Trad = 124.6 M2 
No. 31 
Prefab = 114.0 
M2 No. 29 
Traditional C.1974-5 
Prefab C.1974-5 
(Modular) 
Average C.1974-5 
11,109 
10,543 
10,836 
89 
92 
91 
B. North Kgalagadi 
120 m2 
Prefab 
(Continental) 
Engineering) 11,516 96 Estimated final 
cost after over-
runs. 
C. Kgatleng 
District Estimate 1975-6 c.6,600 average for two 
classrooms. No 
cost overruns 
on this 
estimate. 
D. North-West 
District 1974 8,400 59 
Kweneng 1974 6,800 48 
Southern 
District 1974 6,000 42 
Central 1974 5,800 41 
1974 4,750 33 
Kgatleng 1974 4,560 32 
over 75 km 
from rail, 
under 75 km 
from rail. 
E. Central small 
contractor 1974 4122-4965 28-36) 
médium 
contractor 1974 4548-6111 31-44) 
Council Works 
Unit 1974 5196-5817 35-42) 
small 
con tractor 1974 4896-6620 33-48) 
médium 
contractor 1974 11,248-11,385 81-82) 
Council 
Works Unit 1974 5716-7211 39-52) 
under 75 km 
from rail 
over 75 km 
from rail. 
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(APPENDIX B - continued) 
Sources and Notes: 
A. MOW estimate of average final construction cost in large villages programme. 
B. Project Memoranda: 
Northern Kgalagadi ARDP 2/8/1974 
Northern Kgalagadi Cost Overruns 17/1/75 
T h e estimate of 11,516 is an average of 5 double classroom blocks with fencing, contingency 
and overrun costs, divided between the classrooms and teachers' quarters in proportion to 
their estimated basic capital cost. Final costs of classrooms were probably somewbat higher 
than this. 
C. Project memorándum, Kgatleng District Council Primary School Construction, and personal 
communication from DOD, Mochudi. 
D. Appendix 1 to "Minutes of the First Seminar for District Council Works Superintendents, 
held on the 5th ancl 6th February 1975." It is not clear what these figures include and do not 
include. In order to calcúlate the M2 cost, an area of 143 m2 has been taken. While this is much 
higher than the 124.6 M2 of the conventional buildings in the larger villagers and the 114,0 M2 
of the prefabricated buildings in larger villages, it is preferred since it is an approximate mean 
for the two types of blocks calculated for Central District — one with an area of 138.7 M2, and 
one with an area of 147,0 M2. Evidently, Central District at least was building bigger 
classrooms in the smaller villages than the contractors built in the larger villages. 
E. Central District Council Works Department, "Report on Construction — 1975 mimeo, 
delivered to Works Superintendent Conference, Gaborone, 5th and 6th February, 1975. These 
figures are statecl to be the "real" costs ancl do not appear to include hidden subsidies from the 
Council. They include, for example, estimated costs for the maintenance, depreciation and 
operation of vehicles. They also include an unspecified element for profit. It must be noted, 
however,that although these calculations appear to have been made carefully and on the basis 
of experience, they represent estimates ancl cío not represent actual costs encountered in a 
particular cases. For full details, the reader is referred to the original document. 
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APPENDIX C: Sources of Finance for ARDP Project (Pula) 
Source of 
Project Finance 1973/4 1974/5 1975/6 Total 
Major and rural 
village water 
supplies 
SIDA 
UNICEF 
DDF 
228,733.8 
8,900.7 
13,421.9 
872,979.3 
6,728.0 
113,799.5 
941,274.8 
116,412.6 
2,015,988 
15,629 
243,634 
Underground U.K. develop-
Water deveiopment ment loan 964 14,493.2 67,967.0 83,424 
Contract borehole 
drilling DDF 98,647.18 1,073,289.3 602,239.0 1,774,175.5 
Local Authority 
Deveiopment 
Grants DDF 
WFP 
384,920.1 247,418.0 
15,300.0 
256,824.7 889,163 
15,300 
Tribal Admin. DDF 5,826.8 23,873.0 5,967.2 35,667 
Basic Health 
Services NORAD 
UNHCR 
Anglo-
American 
99,785 
6,000 
776,800 488,595.8 
26,880 
1,365,180.8 
26,880 
6,000 
Primary School 
Equipment 
SIDA 
Danish State 
Loan 
312,850.1 
26,108.7 
788,445.4 
67,330.1 
1,101,295 
93,439 
Primary school 
improvement & 
facilities 
SIDA 
DDF 
WFP 
408,625 
78,447 
646,710 
1,594,853 
70,960 
1,751,540 
912,158 
9,040 
2,806,875 
2,585,458 
80,000 
Primary School 
Stores 
DDF 
SIDA 
52,500 157,620 39,187.9 
52,100 
248,307.9 
52,100 
Rural Industrial 
infrastructure DDF 15,372.5 27,534.0 42,907 
Integrated 
Office blocks DDF 8,271 49,786.1 58,057 
District Council 
And Admin. 
Housing DDF 1,075,706.6 795,880.7 1,871,587 
Rural Power 
Supplies DDF 60,000 8,125 — 68,125 
Rural Roads NORAD 124,331 722,699.3 1,134,083.7 1,981,114 
Major Village 
Roads DDF 64,726.1 2,126,212.7 1,049,828.3 3,240,767 
Livestock 
Saleyards DDF — 7,502 50,391 57,893 
Dams DDF — 145,892 290,385.9 436,277.9 
Totals by Source 
DDF 11,552,019 
SIDA 5,976,258 
NORAD 3,346,295 
WFP 95,300 
Danish State Loan 93,439 
UK Development 
Loan 83,424 
UNHCR 26,880 
UNICEF 15,629 
Anglo-American 6,000 
Total 21,195,244 
Source: Budget Administration Unit, 
Ministry of Finance and Development Planning. 
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APPENDIX E. A Poverty-Ranking Procedure for Projects 
T h e proposal is simple. T h e originating ministry would indicate on each project summary 
(thumbnail sketch) and subsequently on each project memorándum, who would benefit from the 
project and in which zones. T h e relevant part of the summary and memorándum would look 
something like this: 
Who will benefit? 
Group Ranking 
Very Poor 
Poor 
Small Men 
Well-Off 
Wealthy 
In which zones? 
Zone Ranking 
Extra-rural 
Cattle Posts 
Lands 
Small Villages 
Large Villages 
Urban Centres 
NOTES: 
A preliminary indication of the groups might be: 
Very Poor: People without stock and who do not cultivate regularly, including borehole 
squatters, hunters and gatherers, destitutes, cattle herders and traditional dependents. 
Poor: People with small stock only and/or 4 or less h/c and/or who cultivate by borrowing 
animals for draught. 
Small Men: People with small cattle herds (5-20 h/c) or income — equivalent small enterprises. 
Well-Off: People with 20 — 200 h/c or income-equivalent médium enterprises. 
Wealthy: People with over 200 h/c or income-equivalent larger enterprises. 
The ranking (1, 2, 3 ) for group and for zone would be entered in the boxes as appropriate; I 
being high, and 5 low. 
T h e ranking for the beneficiaries would be based on the expected total long-term net direct 
benefits to the group. 
T h e ranking for the zones would be based on the total long-term net direct benefits to persons 
residing in the zone. 
T h e procedure would fit easily into the present system for preparation and submission of 
summaries (thumbnail sketches) and project memoranda as prescribed in the Planning Officers 
Manual Chapter 3. 
T h e ranking would often be a matter of commonsense judgement but occasionally, especially 
where there were disagreements about who would benefit, attempts toquantify might be justified. 
In some cases the ranking would be a matter for discussion between the DEA and the originating 
ministry. T h e DEA wóuld be enabled by the procedure to monitor the extent to which projects 
coming forward were directed towards different groups and zones. 
Some hypothetical examples can be given: 
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Project: Health Posts for Remote Areas 
Who will benefit? In which zones? 
Group Ranking Zone Ranking 
Very Poor 1 Extra Rural 1 
Poor 2 Cattle Posts 2 
Small Men — Lands — 
Well-Off — Small Village — 
Wealthy — Large Villages — 
Urban Centres 
Project: Free Fencing Materials for Communal Grazing Areas 
Who will benefit? In which zones? 
Group Ranking Zone Ranking 
Very Poor — Extra Rural — 
Poor 3 Cattle Posts 3 = 
Small men 1 = Lands 3 = 
Well-Off 1 = Small Villages 1 
Wealthy — Large Village 2 
Urban centres 
Project: Veterinary Quarantine Fence 
Who will benefit? In which zones? 
Group Ranking Zone Ranking 
Very Poor 4 = Extra Rural 4= 
Poor 4 = Cattle Posts 4= 
Small Men 3 Lands 4= 
Well-Off 2 Small Villages 3 
Wealthy 1 Urban centres 1 
Large Villages 1 
Notes: T h e main direct beneficiaries will be big cattle owners in large villages and urban centres. 
Permanent employment in maintenance gangs will be created for 2 foremen and 30 
labourers, mainly from extra rural and cattle posts zones. 
T h e categories for who will benefit and the definitions of zones have been deliberately left 
vague at this stage. They will need to be tightened a little and defined a little more clearly. Care 
should be taken, however, not to be too precise or too perfectionist or the procedure will become 
unnecessarily laborious. 
46 
Referetices 
Campbell, Neil M, ancl John G. Abbott "Botswana's Primary School System: 
a Spatial Analysis," mimeo, Institute of Deveiopment Management, Gaborone, May 1976. 
Folkmann, P. A. "A Study of the building industry in Botswana with the main emphasis on cost" 
Industrial Construction consultancy, Republic of Botswana, March, 1976. 
Guide to the Villages of Botswana, Central Statistics Office, Ministry of Finance and Deveiopment 
Planning, printed by the Government Printer, Gaborone. 
NDP 3: National Deveiopment Plan 1973-78 Part II: Description of Central Government. 
Deveiopment Projects, Ministry of Finance and Deveiopment Planning, printed by the Government 
Printer, Gaborone, September, 1973. 
NDP 4: National Deveiopment Plan 1976-81: Part I: Policies and Objectives (draft Ministry of Finance 
and Deveiopment Planning,) printed by the Government Printer, Gaborone, 1976. 
"Report on Construction — 1974", mimeo, Central District Council, Works Services Department, 
1975. 
Riordan, K.M. ""Self-Help:" A General Discussion," mimeo, January 1975 
The Rural Income Distribution Survey in Botswana 1974/5, Central Statistics Office, Ministry of 
Finance and Deveiopment Planning, printed by the Government Printer, Gaborone. 
" T h e Uses of Food Aid in Botswana", Working Paper No. 3, reference STUD/61, (1976) 
47 
BOTSWANA'S ACCELERATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME 
EXPERIENCE AND LESSONS 
(Contents and Summary Only) 
ROBERT CHAMBERS 
February 
1977 
CONTENTS ' 
The ARDP in Quotations 
Contenta 
List of Tables ~ 
Abbreviations and Usage 
Preface 
Summary 
THE ARDP IN OUTLINE 
Origins and Objectives 
Strategy and Components 
Progress and Achievements 
TI-IE MAIN PROGRAMMES IN PE VIEW 
Major Roads through Villages 
The Construction of Buildings 
construction in the larger 
villages 
construction in the smaller 
villages 
contractors and costs 
School Furniture 
Villcige Water Supplies 
Ministry of Agriculture Programmes 
COSTS AND EFFECTS 
Finance and the Economy 
financial costs in perspective 
the use of dontestic and donor fund 
the ARDP, deveiopment expenditure 
and the economy 
Implementing Capacity 
effects on other programmes 
financial and physical monitoring 
and control 
i - enhanced implementing capacity 
i i 
| The Rural Impact 
employment and income effects 
distribution by District 
the ARDP and self-help 
reaching the periphery and the poor 
I The Costs and Benefits of Speed and 
! Priority 
i 
4
 'l
 :
 kESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 
' / 
An Overview 
For the Future 
-A. 
Appendlces 
A Construction Completed by 31 March 19 76 by 
District and by Larger and Smaller Villages 
B Comparative Estimates for a Block of Two 
Classrooms 
C Sources of Finance for ARDP Projects 
D Expenditure by Project and by District 1973--6 
E A Poverty-Ranking Procedure for Projects 
Referenees 
LIST OF TABLES 
1 Projected Surpluses of Revenue over Recurrent Expenditure 
19 73/74 through 1977/78 in Pula millions 
1.2 Numbers of Primary School Classes and Classrooms 1968 - 1972 
1 3 ARDP-linked Projects 
1.4 ARDP Expenditure by Years 1973 to 31 March 1976 
¡ 
1.5 The Main ARDP Works Completed by 31 March 1976 by District 
2.1 1973-1975 Increase in the Number of Private Vehicles 
lj Licensed in the Villages Receiving Roads 
2.2 Cost History of the Major Roads through Villages 
2.3 ARDP Building Targets and Achievements in the Larger and 
Smaller Villages 
2.4 Principal ARDP Expenditures on the Construction of Buildings 
up to 31 March 19 76 
2.5 Tenders Received for the Larger Villages Building Construction 
Programme 
2.6 Cost Escalation of the Construction Programme in*the Larger 
Villages 
2.7 Smaller Villages Construction Targets and Achievements 
2.8 District Councils
1
 Works Department Expenditures 
2.9 Cost Estimates.of Actually or Potentially Village-related 
Water Projects 
2.10 Rural Water Supplies: Expenditures 1973/4 through 19 75/6 
2.11 Village Water Supplies and Boreholes Complete at 31 March 1976 
3.1 •. Planned and Actual Deveiopment Expenditure 1973/74 throuah 
1975/76 
3.2 Expenditure and Sources of Funds for the Primary School 
Improvement Programme 
3.3 ARDP Expenditures as a Proportion of Total Deveiopment 
Expenditure 
3.4 Increases in District Councils' Budgets 1972-1975/6 
3.5 Councils' Construction P r o g r a m e s : Estimates and Targets 
V J- JC (TI -I- 1 - r. - 2 ~ 
3.G Rural Population and Selected ARDP Expenditure by District 
3.7 New Classrooms per Ilead of Rural Population by District 
3.8 Educational Indicators by Level of Urban-Rural Hierarchy 
t 
The Third National Development Plan 1973-78 set a high 
priority on rural development. In 1972/73 Botswana achieved 
budgetary self-suf f icienc.y for the first time and funds became 
a less serious constraint on development. At the same time 
the need for rural infrastructure was acute and becoming more 
so. In both Central Government and more particularly in District 
Councils, institutionaI developments, including the creation of 
the Rural Development Unit reporting direct to the Vice President, 
and the recruitment of staff to strengthen District Councils, 
were augmenting the capacity to implement programmes. A sense 
of opportunity and urgency vas enhanced by a general awareness 
that the Government had not yet been able to achieve dramatic, 
tangible results in most of the rural areas where the great 
majority of the people lived and by the steady approach of the 
date in October 19 74 when the electorate would pass their verdict 
on the Government's performance. The Accelerated Rural Development 
Programme (ARDP), resulting from a Cabinet decisión in November 
19 73, was a logical outcome. 
The ARDP had as a primary objective that projects should be 
visible on the ground by a target date of 30 September 1974. Various 
"invisible" projects were proposed but dropped. Visibility carne to 
mean mainly buildings, roads and water supplies. Building con-
struction was undertaken in 2 7 larger villages by big contractors 
and in 195 smaller villages by District Councils and by médium and 
small contractors. Other programmes were undertaken either by 
contractors - much of a programme for drilling boreholes in villages, 
and a programme for tarred major roads through large villages - or 
directly by Government Ministries or Departments. While a start had 
been made on most of the programmes by the target date, the ARDP 
v/as twice prolonged and finally ended only on 31 March 1976. By 
that time it had cost just over 21 million Pula. Of this sum, the 
Ministry of Local Government and Lands accounted for 53 per cent, 
the Ministry of VJorks and Communications for 25 per cent, and the 
Ministry of Mineral Resources and Water Affairs for 19 per cent. 
The Ministry of Agriculture
1
 s share v/as only 2.3 per cent. 
The most accelerated and most controversia! programme was 
major roads through villages. 76-79 km of tarred road were to be 
i\dáe in eight of the largest villages. Because of urgency, the 
. - 2 ~ 
' I 
work was put out to tender on the basis of a schedule of rates 
i 
instead of a bilí of quantities. When it was found that the cost 
would be much higher than expected, the length and width of 
tarmac were reduced. The final cost of Pula 4 3,700 per km was 
h'igh compared with Pula 27,600 for a short stretch of the North-
South road constructed to higher specifications. Much dissatis--
faction was expressed about the roads, especially the narrow 
i 
access culverts ancl the cleep ditches. Even at these high costs 
the roads were, however, probably justifiecl economically because 
of the growing volume of traffic in the villages concerned. 
¡ The construction of buildings in the larger and smaller villages 
accounted for 4 3 per cent of all ARDP expenditure. The main 
components were primary school classrooms, stores and latrines, 
teachers' quarters, health clinics and health posts, and District 
Council and Administration housing. After a competitive tender, 
work in the larger villages was awarded to big contractors using 
conventional construction for some villages and prefabricated 
construction for others. There were many complaints about the pre-
fabricated buildings put up by Modular Construction. Costs 
generally were high. Work was carried out most rapidly in the 
Northern Kgalagadi where the impact was drarnatic. In the smaller 
villages, District Councils and smaller contractors shared the 
work. Performance was mixed but more was clone than many would have 
expected. By 31 March 1976, for example/ 305 classrooms had been 
constructed in the smaller villages alone. This may be compared 
with the five-year target of NDP3 of 700 classrooms in the whole 
country. 
It is difficult to compare the costs of the big contractors 
•• in the larger villages ancl those of the District Councils' Works 
Units and of small. contractors in the smaller villages, not least 
because many of the costs in the smaller villages were hidden in 
Councils' recurrent expenditure. However, it is probable that the 
2 
M cost to Government and Councils was higher in the larger villages 
than in the smaller villages. This is partly because of the higher 
overheads, -supervisión costs, and wage bilis of the big contractors 
j.n the larger villages. The ARDP identified and assisted small 
contractors who became more experienced and more competitive. 
District Councils* Works Units were on the whole slow, expensive 
and inefficient. The ARDP not only achieved much infrastructural 
building; it also developed the national capability to build. 
The school furniture programme, organised by the Botswana 
Enterprise Development Unit (BEDU), involved two small engineering 
firms which successfully substituted local for imported fabrication 
of school furniture and which towards the end of 19 76 had become 
independent of BEDU and were handling a third school furniture 
contract. 
The village water supplies programme used the Domestic Develop-
ment Fund to engage contract borehole drilling for small villages, 
thus diverting contract drilling from cattle posts where it would 
benef.it those who were already well off to villages where the water 
would be of more general benefit. Contract drilling was competitive 
and fairly cheap. The 2 5 small villages affected by 31 March 19 76 
benefitted from their water supplies earlier than they would have 
done without the ARDP. 
In the Ministry of Agriculture both the dams project and the 
livestock saleyards project suffered from and were delayed by staffing 
problems, but performance improved. The experience with these two 
projects illustrates the extent to which implementing capacity rather 
than finance was the main constraint in the Ministry. It also high-
lighted the priority of innovations in management to enhance the 
Ministry's capacity to implement. 
Since budgetary self-sufficiency v/as achieved in 1972/73, 
implementing capacity has been more of a brake on development than 
have shortages of funds. In these circumstances it is often rational 
to use money to buy or expand implementing capacity, which is 
precisely what the ARDP did by putting work out to contractors. 
/- -
The speed of the programme did, however, probably mean that 
some donor funds were foregone. For example, the DDF was used to 
finance Pula 2.6 million of the primary school improvement programme 
which might, with less urgency, have been provided by SIDA. 
The ARDP was timely, coming as it did near the end of the 
construction phases of the Shashe and Orapa projects, and helped 
to level off the trough in capital spending and construction. The 
•overheating of the construction sector by the ARDP has been 
exaggerated. Statutory wage increases were a more significant 
factor in higher contract prices, and the ARDP's contribution 
appears to have been relativcly minor, during six months of 197 4 
of the order of 8 per cent. 
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I The ARDP did little damage to other programmes, since what 
i 
was delayed or left undone as a result of the ARDP was usually ¡ 
of ..low priority. The ARDP did, however, provide a convenient 
scapegoat to blarne for ddays and deficiencies. It also showed 
up ministries, departments and individuáis respons.ib.le for lagging 
performance, and showed that they could do more and do it fáster. 
| The administrative and accounting load placed on District 
Councils by the ARDP created a crisis which was largely overcome 
through streamlined procedures and diligent work by Council staff. 
One factor was a reporting and monitoring system designed to improve 
financial and physical monitoring and control. This management 
system proved effective and has been continued and refined. 
The ARDP enhanced implementing capacity. In particular, it 
increased the capability and credibility of District Councils and 
competence and confidence of Council staff. 
During 19 74-5 the ARDP may have generated an average monthly 
employment for semi-skilled and unskilled labour of the order of 
2,000 to 3,000 persons, with a gross payment in wages of Pula 1.2 
to 1.8 million, or from 12 to 18 per cent of ARDP expenditure .in 
that financial year. The ARDP does not appear to have led to wage 
rises. Some additional long-term employment was created, especially 
through the growth of small building contractors and the new, 
higher plateau of District Councils' building programmes. 
District-wise ARDP expenditures have to be treated with great 
care in assessing the regional distribution of benefits from the 
ARDP. Per caput expenditures tended to be high where implementation 
was relatively easy (South East, KgctLeng) and where special measures 
v?ere taken to augment implementing capacity (Kgalagadi) and low 
where implementation was difficult for reasons of scale (Central) 
or administrative capacity was a special problern (North West) . 
Except in the North East District, self-help made little 
contribution to the ARDP. The effect of the ARDP on self-help is 
difficult,to assess but it probably did not weaken self-help much. . 
Self-help has some disadvantages, and will anyway continué for 
purposes which touch people closely. A sensitive review of VDCs, 
Community Deveiopment and self-help would be timely to see the 
best way forward. 
The ARDP helped to combat the bias of services towards towns 
ancl large villages and to push services out towards the rural 
periphery where most of the poorest people live. This push 
continúes, and peripheral people are at the same time becoming 
more vocal and active, using self-help to attract services. 
Unfortunately buildings do not ensure efficient services. For 
exariiple, there is a strong bias against small villages in the 
proportion of trained teachers and in performance .in examinations. 
The situation was improved by ARDP construction of classrooms, 
but teachers' qu¿irters do not appear a major attraction to induce 
trained teachers to work in the remoler areas, especially as 
Councils' rents are high compared with private rents. Apparently 
because of high rents, about half the 190-odd teachers' quarters 
I 
built under the ARDP in Central District are standing ernpty. 
The Plan objective, that "All Batswana, wherever they live 
and whatever their social background, should have eqmil access to 
services that the Government provides - such as education, health 
and water supplies" requires a positive bias towards the poorer 
people and the remoter areas. This has impllcations for both 
staffing and paying for services. Concerning staffing, a new 
approach may be needed, including perhaps a period of national 
service and also special incentives. Concerning paying for services 
access to education, health services, and water would be made more 
equitable if charges for them were abolished .in the rural areas. 
The poor and the very poor would benefit and social justice would 
be served. 
The speed and priority of the ARDP hacl both costs and benefits. 
On the cost sicle, financial expenditure was higher than it would , 
have been, especially with the programme for major roads through 
villages and with the construction carried out by big contractors; 
some outcomes were bacl because of lack of local consultation, of 
inappropriate designs (prefabricated buildings, school furniture, 
etc.), and of problems of supervisión; and there v/as a bias towards 
what could be done quj.ckly to the neglect of types of programme 
needing more care and patience. On the benefit side it is difficult 
to separate benefits from speed from benefits from the programme as 
a whole. Facilities were often reacly for use years earlier than 
they would have been, Services were pushed further out into the 
rural areas, Government capacity to implement v/as lifted onto a 
new platean. The priority of rural development carne to be better 
appreciated in Government, especially among urban-biasecl technical 
officers. Devclopmental changos v/ere forced indirectly through 
the chain of bottlenecks created by the ARDP. Procedural innovation 
v/ere made. Government and Councils gained in confidence and 
cjredibility. One major lesson of the ARDP is that strong political 
leadership and a sense of urgency can forcé and enable the civil 
service to do more, more quickly and better, than wise and prudent 
men might advise to be possible. 
I This selective evaluation of the ARDP is more favourable than 
the writer expected. Much was achieved and does not nov/ have to be 
repeated. But deveiopment is not bricks and mortar. It is one 
thing to construct. It is another, and harder, to ensure that 
services are well staffed, operate well, and are accessible to all. 
I ' 
It is yet harder to achieve the national aim of an equitable distr.i~ 
bution of income when so many of the poorest people are precisely 
those who are furthest away, least well educated, worst informed, 
least in contact with government, and least able to help themselves. 
The ARDP was a step towards them but only on one front. The main 
frontier and the main challenge seem nov; to lie in the much harder 
task of ensuring that economic growth means better lives not just 
for those rural people who are more able to help themselves, but 
specifically for those who are poorer, weaker, and less 'capable of 
taking advantage of opportunities; for those, in short, who tend 
to get left behind and left out. 
Lessons can be drawn from the ARDP experience and suggestions 
made for the future. These are: 
/ 
1. Concerning infrastructure: 
(i) avoiding crash programmes with big contractors 
(ii) monitoring building programmes 
(iii) taking care over designs 
2. Concerning implementing capacity: 
(i) building up staff before any large programme 
(ii) using District Councils to undertake construction for 
Government departments 
(iii) making block grants to District Deveiopment Committees 
(iv) ' pursuing devolution to District Councils and to government 
staff at the local level 
¡ I 
3. Concerning management procedures : 
I 
(i) making management procedures a focus for attention, 
| especially in ministries where implementation lags 
i 
(ii) using locally available management expertise for the 
collaborative design, testing and introduction of such 
procedures 
(iii) introducing a poverty ranking in the project identif.ication 
and appraisal procéss i 
A . Concerning politlcal leadership: 
(i) galvanising the civil service into action for priority 
' programmes 
(ii) enabling Ministers to direct and review performance in 
their Ministries 
5. Concerning the poorer people in the rural areas: 
mounting a programme for promoting rural equity. This 
programme, set in the framework of the Fourth National 
Development Plan, would, like the ARDP, provide support 
and Ímpetus to existing and new projects. These 'projects 
t 
v;ould be selected and designed to focus and accelerate 
the provision of access to resources, income opportunities 
and services, to the more disadvantaged people within the 
rural sector. 
